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I. INTRODUCTION 
Most people familiar with film and literature in the past two 
decades will recognize two dystopias that recur in our popular 
imagination.  Dystopia 1 describes a society fallen in on itself, chaotic 
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and violent.  It is a state of nature, of constant battle between factions 
with a government unable to secure the peace.  It is a picture of never-
ending civil war.1  Dystopia 2 is markedly opposite, a society of order 
and rules in which the state regulates all areas of life carefully, weeds 
out the bad guys and segregates them for the common good.  Those who 
belong live a peaceful life as long as they obey the state.2  Those who do 
not are removed to life in a camp where they cannot infect society with 
their presence or are simply disappeared.  Of course, there are many 
other dystopias and utopias ranging from the alien to the mundane; 
however, it is these two in particular with which we obsess in the United 
States in the post 9/11 era.  These two have become for us the Scylla and 
Charybdis of inclusion and exclusion, vulnerability and security.  The 
fear that multicultural tolerance will lead to a “beirutization” of our 
society has led for calls for greater regulation of the undesirable 
elements of society, for tighter demarcations of the rights and 
obligations of “belonging” and the detention and expulsion of those who 
clearly fall out of that demarcation.3 
It is in the context of this broader debate on multiculturalism versus 
assimilation and the war on terror that a number of states have 
considered enacting measures to prevent the use of shari’ah4 or Islamic 
law in state courts.  These measures have been justified as necessary to 
ensure our national security and to prevent shari’ah from creeping into 
our legal system.5  In the words of an Oklahoma lawmaker, it is a 
“preemptive strike.”6  This Article challenges these claims by arguing 
that there is no threat of shari’ah taking root in our judicial system to the 
detriment of our constitutional rights.  Further, given that most of the 
 
 1. For an example of this in popular film, see CHILDREN OF MEN (Universal Studios 2006); 
THE HANDMAID’S TALE (MGM Studios 1990). 
 2.  See, e.g., ALDOUS HUXLEY, BRAVE NEW WORLD (1932); George Orwell, 1984 (1949); 
An interesting take on the transition from chaos to conformity is V for Vendetta (Warner Brothers 
2005). 
 3.  David Cole, The New McCarthyism: Repeating History in the War on Terrorism, 38 
HARV. CIV. RTS & CIV. LIBERTIES L.REV. 1, 1-30 (2003). 
 4.  I use the spelling “shari’ah” to denote the complex legal system that is an umbrella term 
for the legal science and custom that exists in the Muslim world in all its diversity.  On the other 
hand, “sharia law” is used by the lawmakers who typically reduce the body of knowledge down to 
denote a regressive subset of rules or even a constructed entity that may have little relationship to 
the laws that have governed Muslims at different periods of history.  For an overview of Islamic 
legal history, see KNUT S. VIKOR, BETWEEN GOD AND THE SULTAN: A HISTORY OF ISLAMIC LAW (2005). 
 5.  Amy Sullivan, The Sharia Myth Sweeps America, USA TODAY (June 12, 2011, 5:28 
PM), http://www.usatoday.com/news/opinion/forum/2011-06-12-Sharia-law-in-the-USA_n.htm. 
 6.  Joel Siegel, Islamic Sharia Law to Be Banned in, ah, Oklahoma, ABC NEWS (June 14, 
2010), http://abcnews.go.com/US/Media/oklahoma-pass-laws-prohibiting-islamic-sharia-laws-apply
/story?id=10908521. 
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examples of shari’ah creep come from family law cases, the link to 
national security is illusory.  Instead, in this Article, I will argue, these 
measures should be read as a part of the ongoing project to define 
national identity that partakes of a broader identity discourse about 
Muslims and Americans (as mutually exclusive) in the War on Terror.  
As a result, the laws have social effects such as toleration for profiling 
and calls for expressions of patriotism that negatively impact the lives of 
ordinary Muslims.7  I will further argue that rather than becoming 
distracted with these projects that are primarily aimed at scoring political 
points, the needs of U.S. domestic security are better served by including 
Muslims as full citizens.  Indeed, national security is advanced by 
recognizing the reality that Muslims have a stake in the protection of the 
homeland.  The political diversity within the Muslim community, some 
part of which has supported the War on Terror while others have 
critiqued it, does nothing to diminish the importance of this fact. 
The Article proceeds in three parts: in Part II, the Article describes 
three anti-shari’ah measures.8  It describes Oklahoma’s Save Our State 
amendment to show how these laws target Islam.  It also reviews the 
recent decision by the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirming the 
grant of a preliminary injunction against the certification of Oklahoma’s 
constitutional amendment.  It then describes Arizona’s law that targets 
shari’ah as well as other legal traditions.  It also examines the original 
version of the Tennessee bill to illustrate the motivations behind the 
revised, watered down version that was eventually passed by the 
legislature.  Part II concludes with an examination of the chief architects 
of the model law disseminated to various states and their motivations.9  
The aim is to show how the drafters of the laws were preoccupied not by 
protecting Americans from a threat of terrorists in their midst, but by 
defining “American” identity through the law.10 
In Part III of this Article, I take a deeper look into the claim that the 
laws are necessary because “shari’ah creep” is occurring through family 
 
 7.  Samuel R. Gross and Debra Livingston, Racial Profiling Under Attack, 102 COLUM. L.R. 
1413, 1413-1414 (2002). 
 8.  Louisiana has also passed an anti-foreign law measures, see HB 785 Act. No. 714, 2010 
Leg., 36th Sess. (La. 2010) available at http://www.legis.state.la.us/billdata/
streamdocument.asp?did=722536 (last visited, Mar. 9, 2012).  
 9.  See infra notes 26-74 and accompanying text.  This article does not argue that the courts 
should rely on shari’ah to settle matters or that there should be more use of Islamic law.  I take the 
position that, if religious laws are accommodated by the judiciary, that all religious laws be given 
equal standing without prejudice against a single religion.  Further, my own normative preference is 
that wherever possible, secular law be used and that all religious law in general be excluded from 
judicial determinations. 
 10.  See infra notes 75-187 and accompanying text. 
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law and will eventually bleed into other doctrinal areas of our secular 
system.11  Consequently, I focus on a number of family cases here to 
show how the courts have dealt with religious law in the United States, 
particularly in enforcing foreign judgments from Muslim majority 
countries.12  This analysis makes clear that family law is not the gateway 
for shari’ah to enter the judicial system (thereby posing a threat to our 
security) and that such a view discounts the robust constitutional, choice 
of law rules and public policy preferences that restrain judges from 
diluting our secular system.13 
Finally, in Part IV, I raise the question of what these laws are really 
about if they are not about shari’ah creep or our security.14  I argue that 
while these laws may be discounted as ineffectual or unconstitutional, 
they have an effect on society.  They continue the socially acceptable 
expulsion of Muslims from the mainstream and their marginalization.  
Far from being innocuous, such strategies of (re)constructing Muslims as 
the enemy have real lived consequences such as heightened surveillance 
regulation, incarceration, and even death. 
I conclude with some observations about decoupling stereotypes of 
racial and religious identity from counter-terrorism and integration as 
opposed to assimilation as a way forward.15  In this final section, I argue 
that rather than being distracted by creating outsider groups based on 
identity, our security is better served through inclusion of all those who 
have a stake in the security of their communities and their families. 
II. MUCH ADO ABOUT NOTHING?: STATE ANTI-SHARI’AH LAWS 
In the decade following 9/11, there has been a great deal of concern 
about the ability of Muslims to assimilate into the American 
mainstream.16  In addition, there was also a worry that Islam and 
democracy are in some fundamental ways incompatible and that, indeed, 
American Muslims could not be faithful to both their religion and their 
 
 11.  See infra notes 89-187 and accompanying text. 
 12.  Id.  In most Muslim-majority countries, the only place that shari’ah continues to play a 
significant role is in family law.  See, e.g., Lama Abu-Odeh, Modernizing Muslim Family Law: The 
Case of Egypt, 37 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1043 (2004).  It is no surprise, then, that it is family law 
cases that make up the bulk of the “shari’ah creep” examples in the United States. 
 13.  See generally Jill Schachner Chanen, Anti-Shariah Bills Under Review, ABA JOURNAL 
(May 1, 2011, 2:20 AM CST), http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/the_law_of_the_land/. 
 14.  See infra notes 188-301 and accompanying text. 
 15.  See infra notes 302-311 and accompanying text. 
 16.  See Robert Steinback, Jihad Against Islam, INTELLIGENCE REPORT, no. 142, 2011, 
available at http://www.splcenter.org/get-informed/intelligence-report/browse-all-issues/2011/
summer/jihad-against-islam. 
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country.  This anxiety has manifested itself periodically throughout the 
decade, from the immediate rounding up and profiling of Muslims right 
after the attacks to the Presidential election in 2008, when the 
“allegation” that Barack Obama was a closet Muslim was made into a 
campaign issue and refuted as a “slur.”17  The fear of Muslims and Islam 
failed to derail Obama’s campaign, but it became entrenched in our 
political discourse.18  In other words, the use of “Islam” and the Muslim 
problem as a political rallying tool has become commonplace.19  Under 
these circumstances, it comes as no surprise that politicians would turn 
to the drafting and enactment of laws to deal with this “problem” as a 
vital step in preventing the multiculturalism-gone-wrong dystopia 
described above. 
At the time of this writing, Oklahoma, Arizona, Tennessee, and 
Louisiana have passed some form of anti-shari’ah or anti-foreign law 
measure.20  In addition to these, a significant number of states were 
considering, had introduced, or were in the process of passing similar 
bills.21  Mississippi and Utah had attempted to pass bills but failed to do 
so.22  Complicating matters somewhat, some of the bills introduced were 
challenged immediately and were amended to remove references to 
shari’ah.23  Undoubtedly, other bills will also be amended to read 
neutrally as they are also challenged.  Yet, the challenges have not 
dampened the appetite for the bills.  The number of states joining this 
 
 17.  See Cyra Akila Choudhury, Collateral Damage: The Ghettoization of Muslims in the 
Race to the White House, in RACE 2008: CRITICAL REFLECTIONS ON A HISTORIC CAMPAIGN 62 
(Mendible, ed., 2010). 
 18.  Id.  See also Barry A. Hollander, The Persistence in the Perception of Barack Obama as 
a Muslim in the 2008 Presidential Campaign, 9 J. MEDIA AND RELIG. 55, 55 (2010) (finding that 
media reports debunking the view that Obama is a Muslim did little to change perception); see 
generally Stephen Parks, The Birthers’ Attacks and the Judiciary’s Article III “Defense” of the 
Obama Presidency, 38 S.U. L. REV. 179 (2011). 
 19.  Leon Hadar’s observations from 1992 shed some historical light on this trend.  Two 
decades ago, well before al Qaeda’s attack on the United States, the basic groundwork of creating 
the green peril were already in place.  See Leon T. Hadar, Policy Analysis: The “Green Peril”: 
Creating the Islamic Fundamentalist Threat, CATO INST. POLICY ANALYSIS, no. 177 (Aug. 27, 
1992), available at http://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/pa177.pdf. 
 20.  Chanen, supra note 13. 
 21.  Bill Raftery, Bans on court use of sharia/international law: ABA House of Delegates 
opposes “blanket prohibitions,” state legislatures out of session, GAVEL TO GAVEL (Aug. 8, 2011), 
http://gaveltogavel.us/site/2011/08/08/bans-on-court-use-of-shariainternational-law-aba-house-of-
delegates-opposes-blanket-prohibitions-state-legislatures-out-of-session/. 
 22.  Tim Murphy, Map: Has Your State Banned Sharia?, MOTHER JONES (Feb. 11, 2011, 
8:40 AM PST), http://motherjones.com/mojo/2011/02/has-your-state-banned-sharia-map. 
 23.  The bill’s progression from an explicit anti-shari’ah ban to a neutral law can be found on 
the website of the Tennessee legislature.  Amendment 3 to SB1028, TENNESSEE GENERAL 
ASSEMBLY, http://www.capitol.tn.gov/Bills/107/Amend/SA0654.pdf (last visited Jan. 24, 2013). 
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trend is growing.24  Below, I examine the legal enactments introduced in 
Oklahoma and the challenge to it in the Tenth Circuit.  I also describe 
the Arizona, Tennessee (as originally introduced), and Louisiana laws.25  
These laws are representative of the trend that other states inclined to 
pass anti-shari’ah measures may follow.  As the description reveals, the 
laws generalize broadly about shari’ah, failing to show any real 
understanding of the legal tradition.  Rather, they rely on unexamined 
assumptions that, first, shari’ah is incompatible with our legal system, 
and, second, it poses a danger that can be prevented by such enactments. 
A. State Anti-Shari’ah Bills 
1. Oklahoma’s “Save Our State” Amendment 
Oklahoma’s Constitutional amendment is brief and to the point.  
State Question 755, otherwise referred to as the “Save Our State” 
amendment, asks whether the following should be approved: 
The courts provided for in subsection A of this section, when 
exercising their judicial authority, shall uphold and adhere to the law 
as provided for in the United States Constitution, the Oklahoma 
Constitution, the United States Code, federal regulations promulgated 
pursuant thereto, established common law, the Oklahoma Statutes and 
rules promulgated thereto, and if necessary the law of another state of 
the United States provided the law of the other state does not include 
Sharia Law, in making judicial decisions.  The courts shall not look to 
the legal precepts of other nations or cultures.  Specifically, the courts 
shall not consider international law or Sharia Law.  The provisions of 
this subsection shall apply to all cases before the respective courts 
including, but not limited to, cases of first impression.26 
The ballot title for the amendment read as follows: 
This measure amends the State Constitution.  It changes a section that 
deals with the courts of this state.  It would amend Article 7, Section 1.  
It makes courts rely on federal and state law when deciding cases.  It 
forbids courts from considering or using international law.  It forbids 
 
 24.  John Esposito, Norway attacks a wakeup call for a world, WASH. POST BLOG (July 30, 
2011, 7:27 AM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/on-faith/post/norway-attacks-a-wakeup-
call-for-a-world/2011/07/29/gIQAZ4N4iI_blog.html. 
 25.  S.B. 1028, 107th Gen. Assemb., Biennial Sess. (Tenn. 2011) (effective July 1, 2011 as 
2011 Tenn. Pub. Acts 497); H.B. 2582, 50th Leg., 1st Sess. (Ariz. 2011); Okla. Const. art. VII, § 
1(C). 
 26.  H.R.J. Res. 1056, 52d Leg., (Okla. 2010) (State Question Number 755), available at 
https://www.sos.ok.gov/documents/questions/755.pdf. 
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courts from considering or using Sharia Law. 
International law is also known as the law of nations.  It deals with the 
conduct of international organizations and independent nations, such as 
countries, states and tribes.  It deals with their relationship with each 
other.  It also deals with some of their relationships with persons. 
The law of nations is formed by the general assent of civilized nations.  
Sources of international law also include international agreements, as 
well as treaties. 
Sharia Law is Islamic law.  It is based on two principal sources, the 
Koran and the teaching of Mohammed.27 
This broadly stated provision prevents state courts from using shari’ah or 
even considering it in deciding cases.  The initial draft of the ballot title 
and measure was submitted to the Secretary of State and reviewed by the 
attorney general as part of the process for submission to the electorate.28  
It is of interest here that, as originally drafted, the ballot title did not 
define shari’ah.  For that reason, the attorney general declared that it did 
not meet the requirements of applicable state law because it failed to 
“adequately explain the effect of the proposition because it does not 
explain what either shari’ah law or international law is.”29  In order to 
remedy this defect, the attorney general’s office then provided the 
following statement: “Sharia Law is Islamic law.  It is based on two 
principal sources, the Koran and the teaching of Mohammed.”30  The 
state defines shari’ah with a tautological non-definition (Islamic law) 
and acknowledges only two sources of law.31  The measure passed in the 
general election with 70.08% of voters in favor.32 
 
 27.  Id.  
 28.  Letter from M. Susan Savage, Okla. Sec’y of State, to W.A. Drew Edmondson, Okla. 
Att’y Gen. (May 25, 2010) (on file with author), available at https://www.sos.ok.gov/documents/
questions/755.pdf. 
 29.  Letter from W.A. Drew Edmondson, Okla. Att’y Gen., to M. Susan Savage, Okla. Sec’y 
of State (June 2, 2010) (on file with author), available at https://www.sos.ok.gov/
documents/questions/755.pdf.  Amendments to the state’s constitution consist of two parts; first, a 
ballot title that explains the proposed amendment and, second, the amendment itself.  Once the 
measure is put to the vote, if it gains a majority, it is certified by the Election Board upon which the 
measure takes effect.   
 30.  Letter from W.A. Drew Edmondson, Okla. Att’y Gen., to M. Susan Savage, Okla. Sec’y 
of State (June 4, 2010) (on file with author), available at https://www.sos.ok.gov/documents/
questions/755.pdf. 
 31.  See generally MOHAMMED HASHIM KAMALI, PRINCIPLES OF ISLAMIC JURISPRUDENCE 
(2003). 
 32.  General Election Results, OKLA. STATE ELECTION BD. (Nov. 12, 2010), 
http://www.ok.gov/elections/support/10gen.html. 
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The election result precipitated a suit by Muneer Awad seeking to 
enjoin the certification of the amendment.33  Mr. Awad was granted a 
preliminary injunction by the district court on November 22, 2010.34  
The state then filed an appeal in December 2010, and the Court of 
Appeals heard the case in September 2011.35  After receiving 
supplemental briefs on the Establishment Clause issue, the court issued 
its opinion on January 10, 2012.36  The Court of Appeals for the Tenth 
Circuit issued a ruling upholding a preliminary injunction that prevented 
the amendment becoming law.37 
While the decision will undoubtedly generate analysis of the 
substantive and procedural constitutional issues, the case is interesting 
for this article because the court recognizes both the lack of harm the 
amendment seeks to prevent and the real harm that the architects of 
these laws actually seek to inflict on Muslims.  In dismissing the state’s 
argument that Mr. Awad’s claim of being injured is a “personal 
opinion,” the court posits “the harm alleged by Mr. Awad stems from a 
constitutional directive of exclusion and disfavored treatment of a 
particular religious legal tradition.”38  Analyzing the four factors 
required for a preliminary injunction, the court applied the test found in 
Larson v. Valente,39 which applies when the state discriminates among 
religions.40  Rejecting the argument that the test did not apply, the court 
opined that “legislatures seldom pass laws that make ‘explicit and 
deliberate distinctions between different religious organizations.’”41  If a 
law does so discriminate, it is subject to strict scrutiny.  By singling out 
shari’ah without mention of any other religious tradition, the law 
certainly triggers Larson.42  Moreover, the state’s argument that nations 
and cultures should be read to mean other religions was dismissed by the 
court: 
The amendment bans only one form of religious law—Sharia law.  
Even if we accept Appellants’ argument that we should interpret 
cultures to include “religions,” the text does not ban all religious 
 
 33.  Awad v. Ziriax, 754 F.Supp. 2d 1298, 1302 (W.D. Okla. 2010). 
 34.  Id. at 1301. 
 35.  Awad v. Ziriax, 670 F.3d 1111, 1119 (10th Cir. 2012). 
 36.  Id. at 1111. 
 37.  See id. at 1298. 
 38.  Id. at 1123.  
 39.  456 U.S. 228 (1982). 
 40.  Id. at 255 (applying strict scrutiny to laws that discriminate among religions). 
 41.  See Awad, 754 F. Supp. 2d at 1127. 
 42.  Id. 
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laws.43 
As I argue below, the architects of these model laws are not preoccupied 
with “whatever religions the legislature considered to be part of 
domestic or Oklahoma culture,” only “other” laws and cultures.  The 
state’s position, therefore, is a distinction without a difference as the 
court correctly surmises. 
Having activated Larson’s strict scrutiny review, the state had to 
defend the amendment by showing that it had a compelling interest in 
passing the law and that the law was narrowly tailored to achieving that 
interest.  However, the state could not show any compelling interest, let 
alone that the law was narrowly tailored.  The single, vague statement 
that is provided on this prong of the test is “Oklahoma certainly has a 
compelling interest in determining what law is applied in Oklahoma 
courts.”44  No particular harm originating in the use of shari’ah is 
forwarded by the state as evidence of a need for the law.  There is no 
“actual problem the challenged amendment seeks to solve.”45  Upon 
failing to show a compelling interest, the state could not survive strict 
scrutiny.  Even though it was not necessary to the inquiry because of 
failure on the first prong, the court made the following observation about 
the “narrowly tailored” prong of the test: “Even if the state could 
identify and support a reason to single out and restrict Sharia law in its 
courts, the amendment’s complete ban of Sharia law is hardly an 
exercise of narrow tailoring.”46  In effect, this is recognition of the 
oversimplification and blanket condemnation of shari’ah in its entirety. 
What is the real harm that the law inflicts on Muslims?  In order to 
obtain a preliminary injunction, Mr. Awad had to show that the harm to 
him is irreparable.  In appealing the lower court’s decision, the state 
argued that Mr. Awad (and by extension all Oklahoma Muslims) would 
suffer no harm if the injunction were denied (thus allowing the 
amendment to take legal effect).47  However, the court agrees that Mr. 
Awad would, indeed, suffer an irreparable condemnation injury if the 
injunction were denied.48  Moreover, the balance of harms weighed in 
favor of Mr. Awad, whose injury through the violation of his 
constitutional rights would be graver than that of voters who “wish to 
 
 43.  Id. at 1129. 
 44.  Id. at 1130. 
 45.  Id. at 1130. 
 46.  Id. at 1131. 
 47.  Id. at 1120. 
 48.  Id. at 1131. 
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enact a likely unconstitutional” law.49  It is important to note here that 
the state and the architects of the laws claim that there is no injury 
suffered by Muslim citizens of Oklahoma when their state seeks to 
enshrine into the state constitution an amendment that in effect 
stereotypes and singles them and their sacred law out as a threat—recall 
that the amendment is called “Save Our State.”50  Legally mandating the 
outsider status of Muslims then amounts to nothing more than hurting 
their feelings!  And this condemnation should be borne in spite of the 
fact that the state was unable to provide any examples of the necessity of 
the law.51 
Regardless of the failure of the state in defending the law from 
being temporarily enjoined, the state has vowed to continue to a trial on 
the merits.52  In the meanwhile, House Bill 1552 has been introduced in 
the legislature following the ballot measure that prohibits use of foreign 
law if it violates the rights guaranteed.53  That bill, which makes no 
reference to shari’ah, has passed unchallenged in the state legislature 
thus far.54 
2. Arizona House Bill 2582 
Arizona has already gained a measure of attention for its broad-
ranging immigration reform bill that was enjoined by a federal court 
almost immediately after passage.55  In this bill, Arizona follows other 
states attempting to limit the laws that courts may apply in making their 
decisions on the merits.  Specifically, the bill states that: 
A. A court shall not use, implement, refer to or incorporate a tenet of 
any body of religious sectarian law into any decision, finding or 
opinion as controlling or influential authority. 
. . . . 
C. Any decision or ratification of a private agreement that is 
determined on the merits, by a judge in this state who relies on any 
body of religious sectarian law or foreign law is void, is appealable 
error and is grounds for impeachment and removal from office. 
 
 49.  Id. 
 50.  Id. at 1117-18. 
 51.  Id. at 1131. 
 52.  Id. at 1137 (reaffirming the issuance of the temporary injunction). 
 53.  H.B. 1552, 53rd Leg., 1st Sess. (Okla. 2011). 
 54.  Bill Information for H.B. 1552, OKLA. STATE LEGISLATURE, http://
www.oklegislature.gov/BillInfo.aspx?Bill=hb1552 (last visited Jan. 24, 2013). 
 55.  H.B. 2582, 50th Leg., 1st Sess. § 12-181(A), (C), (F)(3) (Ariz. 2011).  
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. . . . 
F. 3. “Religious sectarian law” means any statute, tenet or body of law 
evolving within and binding a specific religious sect or tribe.  
Religious sectarian law includes Sharia law, Canon law, Halacha and 
Karma but does not include any law of the United States or the 
individual states based on Anglo-American legal traditions and 
principles on which the United States was founded.56 
The bill forecloses the reliance on religious law to give meaning to 
private agreements; however, it carves out marriages conducted in 
religious ceremonies, and it also carves out law that is based on the 
Anglo-American legal tradition or principles, much of which trace their 
roots to English ecclesiastical law.57  Arizona’s bill expands the 
prohibition to other faith communities, including Jewish, Catholic, 
Hindu, and Buddhist communities whose laws can no longer be given 
any effect in the courts.58  It departs from the Oklahoma provision by 
including other religious law but is also consonant with it in including 
international law or “foreign law.”59 
3. The Original Tennessee Senate Bill 1028 
Tennessee has gained attention in recent years as the location of 
one of the bitterest mosque-building disputes in the nation.  Well before 
the Park 51 controversy, the Muslim community in Murfreesboro, 
Tennessee was embroiled in a campaign to prevent the building of a 
mosque in the town.60  While that controversy is still being resolved in 
 
 56.  Id. (emphasis added). 
 57.  Id. at § 12-181 (E). 
 58.  Id. at § 12-181 (F)(3). 
 59.  Id. at § 12-181 (C), (E)(3).  It is interesting to note that Arizona also passed a bill 
restricting the teaching of any subject that promotes resentment towards a race or ethnicity or 
promotes racial solidarity.  H.B. 2281, 49th Leg., 2d Sess. (Ariz. 2010).  While the bill is written 
innocuously and seems to state the obvious, the intent behind it has been questioned by minority 
groups.  See, e.g., Nicole Santa Cruz, Arizona bill targeting ethnic studies signed into law, LA TIMES 
(MAY 12, 2010), http://articles.latimes.com/2010/may/12/nation/la-na-ethnic-studies-20100512. 
H.B. 2281 bans schools from teaching classes that are designed for students of a particular ethnic 
group, promote resentment or advocate ethnic solidarity over treating pupils as individuals.  The bill 
also bans classes that promote the overthrow of the U.S. government.   
The bill was written to target the Chicano, or Mexican American, studies program in the Tucson 
School System, said state Supt. of Public Instruction Tom Horne.  Id.  
 60.  See Arson reported at Tennessee mosque construction site, USA TODAY (Aug. 29, 2010, 
2:55 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/news/religion/2010-08-29-arson28_ST_N.htm.  During this 
ongoing conflict, Muslims in the town have had the site of the mosque vandalized, suffered arson, 
and experienced threats to their safety.  The opponents of the mosque have painted the mosque as a 
possible venue for the recruitment of terrorists, a terrorist training center or a refuge for radicalism.  
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the courts as of this writing, a new avenue of challenge has opened up.  
In February 2011, Senator Bill Ketron from Murfreesboro, Tennessee 
introduced a bill in the Tennessee Senate ostensibly to prevent support 
for “shariah organizations.”  The bill entitled the Material Support to 
Designated Entities Act of 2011 was introduced into the Tennessee 
Senate in February 2011 with a proposed enactment date of July 1, 
2011.61  Subsequently, Tennessee retreated62 from the specific 
references to shari’ah, but examining the original text in order to 
understand the genesis of the amended version and the true intent of the 
bill that is no longer obvious from the current bill sheds light on the 
motivations behind similar measures.63 
In Section I of the original bill, the drafters laid out the general 
purpose of the bill as a measure to counter a growing threat of terrorism.  
The claim that was forwarded was that homegrown terrorism: 
[I]s primarily the result of a legal-political-military doctrine and 
system adhered to, or minimally advocated by tens of millions if not 
hundreds of millions of its followers around the world.  This legal-
political-military doctrine and system is known as sharia to its 
adherents, authoritative leaders, and scholars.64 
Having made the causal connection among millions of shari’ah 
adherents, shari’ah, and homegrown terrorism, the bill continued on to 
redefine shari’ah tautologically.65  This redefinition essentially created 
the basis of the rest of the law.  The bill stated that “sharia as a political 
doctrine” requires its adherents to overthrow the secular order and 
establish a state governed by shari’ah.66  It claimed that jihad is an 
intrinsic and central feature of shari’ah and that shari’ah requires jihad 
in order to establish itself through violent and criminal means, including 
 
For a nationwide look at anti-mosque activity, see Map—Nationwide Anti-Mosque Activity, ACLU, 
available at http://www.aclu.org/maps/map-nationwide-anti-mosque-activity (last visited, Jan. 24, 
2013) [hereinafter “ACLU Map”]. 
 61.  S.B. 1028, 107th Gen. Assemb., Biennial Sess. (Tenn. 2011) (effective July 1, 2011 as 
2011 Tenn. Pub. Acts 497). 
 62.  The text of the new bill makes no mention of shari’ah at all, see supra note 23. 
 63.  The bill, as it was amended, aligned more closely with anti-terrorism bills akin to the 
PATRIOT Act.  For amendments, see Bill Information for S.B. 1028, TENN. GEN. ASSEMBLY 
available at http://wapp.capitol.tn.gov/apps/BillInfo/Default.aspx?BillNumber=SB1028&ga=107 
(last visited, Jan. 24, 2013). 
 64.  S.B. 1028 at § (I)(39-13-902)(2). 
 65.  Id. at § (I)(39-13-902)(8).  In this, we can read a sense of every Muslim who follows 
shari’ah, that is, every observant Muslim, is a terrorist because their beliefs necessarily lead to 
terrorism. 
 66.  Id. at § (I)(39-13-902)(4), (5). 
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terrorism and “immigration-fed population growth.”67  The law also 
stated that the adherence to shari’ah constitutes “a conspiracy to further 
the legal, political and military doctrine” that results in terrorism.68  
Under the law, knowing adherence to shari’ah provides “prima facie 
evidence of an act to overthrow of the United States.”69  The bill allowed 
the attorney general to designate groups as “sharia organizations” if they 
are “two or more persons acting in concert in support of, sharia or 
imposition of sharia” and they commit a terrorist act.70  Material support 
for terrorists is included in the list of acts that qualifies as terrorism.71  A 
person found knowingly supporting a “sharia organization” would be 
guilty of a criminal offense punishable by fifteen years in prison.72 
The Act in its original and even in its amended form is in essence 
an anti-syndicalism measure and bears similarities to other national 
security measures preventing material support for proscribed 
organizations engaged in terrorism.  However, its original aim was to 
prevent the takeover of the state and U.S. government by Islamist 
radicals engaged in a political struggle to establish an Islamic state in 
the United States.73  The rewritten version of the bill removes all the 
references to shari’ah and looks like a generic anti-terrorism bill,74 but 
the original version gives us an opportunity to examine the historical 
evolution of the specifically anti-shari’ah bills and how Muslims and 
Islam are constructed, defined, and regulated by those proposing and 
supporting these bills. 
B. The Architects of the New Threat 
Legislative history and intent are important windows into the law.75  
In the analysis of the current anti-shari’ah and anti-foreign law 
 
 67.  Id. at § (I)(39-13-902)(6), (10). 
 68.  Id. at § (I)(39-13-902)(11). 
 69.  Id. at § (I)(39-13-902)(13). 
 70.  Id. at § (I)(39-13-904)(2), § (I)(39-13-905)(a)(1)(B). 
 71.  TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-803(7)(A)-(B) (West 2013).  
(7) “Material support or resources”: 
(A) Means any property, tangible or intangible, or service, including currency or 
monetary instruments or financial securities, financial services, lodging, training, expert 
advice or assistance, safe houses, false documentation or identification, communications 
equipment, facilities, weapons, lethal substances, explosives, transportation, and 
personnel; and 
(B) Does not include medicine or religious materials 
 72.  S.B. 1028 § (I)(39-13-906)(a)(1)(A), (B). 
 73.  Id. at § (I)(39-13-902)(2), (8), (13). 
 74.  H.B. 1353, 107th Gen. Assemb., Biennial Sess. (Tenn. 2011).   
 75.  Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 896 (1984). 
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measures, the writings and public declarations of drafters and proponents 
is a critical source from which we can draw to understand intent and 
meaning and also the intended effects of the law.76  In other words, we 
get a sense of what work the law is meant to do in our society.  In this 
section, I want to examine the intent of these laws by drawing primarily 
from the public statements of their drafters and sponsors. 
The bills that have been introduced into state legislatures have 
common points of origin.77  They reflect a social movement to counter a 
perceived threat of the encroachment of shari’ah in the United States.78  
Citing the use of shari’ah in the United Kingdom and the statements of 
Archbishop of Canterbury Rowan Williams that some forms of shari’ah 
could be used in the state judiciary to settle cases there, the U.S. 
opponents have made it clear that no such developments are welcome 
here.79  The anti-shari’ah movement has been active in supporting the 
vigorous regulation of Muslims in general and this particular issue is a 
spoke in a wheel of broader goals which I shall discuss in greater depth 
in Part III.80 
In the wake of the Park51, the mosque that was to be built near 
Ground Zero,81  the latest legal effort at keeping Muslims in the margins 
 
 76.  See generally Legislative History and Statutory Interpretation: The Relevance of English 
Practice, 29 U. SAN FRANCISCO L.R. 1 (1994); see also, Paul E. McGreal, A Constitutional Defense 
of Legislative History, 13 WM. & MARY BILL OF RTS. J. 1267 (2005).  In arguing for the use of 
legislative history, McGreal states that: 
I am not arguing that every scrap of legislative history has equal importance. As with 
any other aspect of context, each piece must be weighed against the others to consider 
how well it describes the overall context of enactment.  The Supreme Court has done just 
that in according different weight to different types of legislative history.  For example, 
the Court gives drafting history heavy weight, as it shows the different choices made in 
crafting statutory language.  Similarly, a legislator’s or committee’s explanation of a 
“text’s pedigree” can offer guidance on interpretation, and a conference committee 
report may shed significant light on a statute’s meaning.   
Id. at 1298. 
 77.  Andrea Elliot, The Man Behind the Anti-Shariah Movement, N.Y. TIMES (July 30, 2011), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/31/us/31shariah.html?pagewanted=1&_r=1. 
 78.  Steinback, Jihad Against Islam, supra note 16.  
 79.  George Neumayr, The Sharia-Compliant American Left, THE AM. SPECTATOR (Sept. 23, 
2010, 6:08 AM), http://spectator.org/archives/2010/09/23/the-sharia-compliant-american. 
 80.  See infra notes 188-300 and accompanying text. 
 81.  During this time, several mosque controversies also arose, although Park51 was the most 
prominent controversy.  The fact that mosque projects faced opposition in far-flung places such as 
Murfreesboro, Tennessee and Sheboygan, Wisconsin indicates a broader disapproval.  See ACLU 
Map, supra note 60.  Muslim communities attempting to build mosques have been vociferously 
opposed on the grounds of traffic, parking, and crowding.  However, as the controversies become 
more heated, the fact that the opposition is based on a belief that these mosques will be breeding 
grounds for terrorists becomes increasingly apparent.  It is worth noting that those who have made a 
stand against the building of mosques have gone beyond the legal arena to fight the threat.  For 
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has been these anti-shari’ah measures.  At the forefront of this endeavor 
are groups like Act! For America, Society of Americans for National 
Existence (“SANE”); Stop Islamization of America (“SIOA”); and the 
American Public Policy Alliance (“APPA”).82  Indeed, one person in 
particular has been identified as the drafter of the model law that has 
been the basis of a majority of the state enactments.  He is linked with 
SANE and the APPA, and although the model law says nothing about 
shari’ah, the intent of the law is clearly stated on their websites: 
“American Laws for American Courts was crafted to protect American 
citizens’ constitutional rights against the infiltration and incursion of 
foreign laws and foreign legal doctrines, especially Islamic Shariah 
Law.”83  Despite attempts to clarify the position on his website that the 
law is not aimed at peaceful practice, the author of the bill makes no 
attempt to distinguish what is meant by “peaceful” practice of Islam and 
captures all of shari’ah as a threat to U.S. constitutional rights.84  There 
is no attempt to explain what precisely is meant by “infiltration” or 
“incursion,” suggesting by the use of these words that the courts are 
eschewing U.S. law in favor of applying shari’ah!85  Despite the 
disclaimers in other venues, the website that offers the model law for 
adoption makes clear that all of shari’ah generally, and consequently all 
Islam, is a threat and, indeed, it is family law in particular that is 
problematic.  These views have found fertile ground amongst certain 
politicians who have adopted the cause and moved it forward legally in 
state legislatures and in the public discourse.  For example: 
Unfortunately, increasingly, foreign laws and legal doctrines—
including and especially Shariah law—are finding their way into US 
court cases.  Invoking Shariah law, especially in family law cases, is a 
 
instance, in Murfreesboro, Tennessee, the site of the mosque in question was set on fire, destroying 
construction equipment.  See supra note 60.  As of this writing, there were mosque controversies 
either ongoing or in the last decade in Tennessee, Oregon, Wisconsin, New Jersey, Maryland, New 
York, Florida, California, and Mississippi. See ACLU Map, supra note 60. 
 82.  Steinback, Jihad Against Islam, supra note 16; Robert Steinback, The Anti-Muslim Inner 
Circle, INTELLIGENCE REPORT, Summer 2011, available at http://www.splcenter.org/get-
informed/intelligence-report/browse-all-issues/2011/summer/the-anti-muslim-inner-circle; Elliot, 
supra note 77. 
 83.  American Laws for American Courts, AM. PUB. POLICY ALLIANCE, 
http://publicpolicyalliance.org/?page_id=38 (last visited Jan. 13, 2013) (emphasis added). 
 84.  Press Release, Am. Pub. Policy Alliance, Spokesman Stephen M. Gelé statement 
responding to CAIR-MI Attacks on American Laws for American Courts (Aug. 16, 2011), available 
at http://publicpolicyalliance.org/?page_id=586. 
 85.  SANE Staff, SANE: Backgrounder for Update Below: A Tale of Lies, Cries, and Demise, 
SOC’Y OF AMS. FOR NAT’L EXISTENCE (Mar. 1, 2011, 2:33 PM), http://www.saneworks.us/
indexnew.php. 
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means of imposing an agenda on the American people while 
circumventing the US and state constitutions by using foreign laws 
which do not recognize our constitutional rights and liberties in US 
courts. 
The potential impact of using foreign and international laws and legal 
doctrines in US courts on the liberty of ordinary American citizens are 
as profound as they are despairing.  The embrace of foreign legal 
systems such as Shariah law, which is inherently hostile to our 
constitutional liberties, is a violation of the principles on which our 
nation was founded.86 
A cursory review of the public comments made by other politicians 
favoring anti-shari’ah measures and expressing suspicion of Muslims 
reveals similar racist views.  Recent Republican presidential candidate, 
Herman Cain stated that he would not hire Muslims in his administration 
in contravention of civil rights laws that prohibit employment 
discrimination for religion.87  Similarly, State Representative Rick 
Wormick of Tennessee’s Rutherford County has said that Muslims 
should not be allowed to serve in the military.  In an email sent to a local 
television station, he opines: “The question that is being asked is how do 
we tell who is a devout Muslim who follows Sharia Law, versus a 
Muslim who feels he can worship within the context of our first 
amendment.  The answer is, we cannot.”88  The point I want to 
 
 86.  Letter from Rosie Marie Swanger, Pa. Rep., to All H. Members, Pa. (June 14, 2011), 
available at http://www.legis.state.pa.us/WU01/LI/CSM/2011/0/8559.pdf (emphasis added). 
 87.  See Willoughby Mariano, PolitiFact: Herman Cain said more than once he wouldn’t hire 
Muslims, TAMPA BAY TIMES, June 10, 2011, available at http://www.tampabay.com/news/politics/
national/article1174539.ece. 
[A] blogger for liberal ThinkProgress.org questioned him: 
“Would you be comfortable appointing a Muslim either in your Cabinet or as a federal 
judge?” the blogger asked. 
“No, I will not,” Cain replied. “And here’s why. There is this creeping attempt, there’s 
this attempt to gradually ease sharia law and the Muslim faith into our government. It 
does not belong in our government.”   
Id. 
 88.  Alan Frio, See Tennessee lawmaker defends anti-Sharia Law comments, WSMV (Nov. 
13, 2011, 11:40 PM EST), http://www.wsmv.com/story/16030338/tennessee-lawmaker-defends-
anti-sharia-law-comments.  The politician whose comments at an anti-shari’ah conference were 
reported in the news defended his views with the following: 
In the e-mail sent to Channel 4 Nov. 13, Womick states, “[t]he question that is being asked is how 
do we tell who is a devout Muslim who follows Sharia Law, versus a Muslim who feels he can 
worship within the context of our first amendment.  The answer is, we cannot.” 
While Womick doesn’t paint every Muslim in the military as wanting to kill their fellow service 
members, Womick makes it clear of his concern for Sharia Law. 
“Sharia Law prohibits all Muslims from killing a fellow believer/Muslim, even if they are the 
enemy,” said Womick.  The penalty for doing so, says Womick, is hell.  Id. 
16
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underscore here is that the fear of Islam and “shari’ah creep” is not 
simply confined to the social but is now an acceptable part of the 
political ideology of a growing number of people who hold the keys to 
public power.  That political ideology drives these reforms, making law 
its vehicle. 
The broad stereotypes and assumptions about shari’ah in U.S. 
courts are not supported by any facts.  What is the agenda of the 
individual litigants in a family law case or the courts adjudicating a case 
involving shari’ah?  The suggestion in the materials is imposition of 
shari’ah on the entire citizenry.  And how is this imposition to be 
achieved? 
III. FAMILY LAW AS FIFTH COLUMN: SHARI’AH CREEP IN U.S. COURTS? 
The proponents of anti-shari’ah measures have also argued publicly 
that these laws are necessary to preserve our national security.  They 
draw a connection between the cases in which shari’ah-based foreign 
law is given comity in our courts and the erosion of the constitutional 
protections and liberties.  In short, the argument seems to run that if a 
judge gives effect to a marriage or a divorce conducted under shari’ah in 
a foreign country, he might in reality be opening the door to jihadist 
ideology.  That claim requires a leap of logic that cannot be sustained 
unless one assumes that any and all shari’ah is jihadism and that giving 
it any quarter is sliding down the slippery slope to a theocratic Islamist 
state.  Setting aside the concerns about terrorism, the effects of these 
laws on precisely the doctrinal area of family law are likely to be quite 
serious for individual Muslim litigants and other religious communities 
should the laws be interpreted and applied as they are meant even if they 
have no broader legal effect. 
In this section, I evaluate the ways in which the courts have dealt 
with shari’ah law in determining the cases before them in four areas: 
marriage, divorce, child custody, and marital agreements.  The cases 
discussed below appear on a list that SANE cites as evidence of 
shari’ah-creep in our judiciary.89  But as I demonstrate, these cases do 
not suggest the trend that anti-shari’ah groups claim and, therefore, do 
not support the position taken by proponents of the anti-shari’ah laws.  
Rather they show that the courts decide whether to give comity to 
foreign judgments through the application of secular methods that work 
without any need for additional laws prohibiting foreign laws. 
 
 89.  See SANE Staff, SANE Email Update, vol. 6; no. 2, SOC’Y OF AMS. FOR NAT’L 
EXISTENCE (Apr. 22, 2010), available at http://www.saneworks.us/indexnew.php. 
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Also as a prefatory matter, it is important to recall that the 
Supremacy Clause states that the Constitution is the supreme law of the 
land.90  Moreover, courts routinely refuse to enforce or give comity to 
laws from other jurisdictions and religious laws that conflict with the 
public policy of the state.91  Taken together, there are finite thresholds 
that foreign and religious laws may not cross if they contravene either 
the U.S. Constitution or the forum’s public policy.92 
A. Marriage 
Family law is one doctrinal area in the U.S. courts in which shari’ah 
is periodically implicated.93  In marriages and divorces conducted in 
different jurisdictions and private marital agreements that parties seek to 
enforce in the United States, shari’ah rules are implicated through these 
legal systems.  However, this by itself has caused no problems until the 
recent furor.  As a general matter, when a marriage is conducted in a 
country that operates under shari’ah, it is considered valid in the United 
States unless it contravenes public policy.94  For instance, in Islamic 
 
 90.  U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.   
This Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance 
thereof; and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United 
States, shall be the supreme law of the land; and the judges in every state shall be bound 
thereby, anything in the Constitution or laws of any State to the contrary 
notwithstanding.   
Id. 
See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 405 (1819) 
If any one proposition could command the universal assent of mankind, we might expect 
it would be this—that the government of the Union, though limited in its powers, is 
supreme within its sphere of action. This would seem to result, necessarily, from its 
nature. It is the government of all; it’s powers are delegated by all; it represents all, and 
acts for all.  Though any one State may be willing to control its operations, no State is 
willing to allow others to control them. The nation, on those subjects on which it can act, 
must necessarily bind its component parts.  But this question is not left to mere reason: 
the people have, in express terms, decided it by saying, ”this constitution, and the laws of 
the United States, which shall be made in pursuance thereof,” “shall be the supreme law 
of the land,” and by requiring that the members of the State legislatures and the officers 
of the executive and judicial departments of the States shall take the oath of fidelity to it.  
The government of the United States, then, though limited in its powers, is supreme; and 
its laws, when made in pursuance of the constitution, form the supreme law of the land, 
“anything in the constitution or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding.”  
 91.  See Aleem v. Aleem, 947 A.2d 489, 500 (Md. 2008), Telnikoff v. Matusevitch, 702 A.2d 
230, 238 (Md. 1997). 
 92.  See Aleem, 947 A.2d 489; Telnikoff, 702 A.2d 230.  
 93.  The court never simply enforces shari’ah except by way of choice of law provisions that 
are guaranteed as part of our freedom of contract.  The other ways in which it is considered is 
through the examination and application of foreign law, which might incorporate shari’ah.   
 94.  The law of the place of celebration determines a marriage’s validity.  See, e.g., Symeon 
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countries that allow for plural marriages, all the marriages would be 
legally valid.  However, in the United States, polygamy is prohibited for 
public policy reasons, resulting in the non-recognition of all but the first 
marriage.95 
On occasion, a U.S. court has had to decide whether or not a 
marriage is validly entered into.  If the marriage has been conducted in a 
jurisdiction that requires religious marriages, the court must inquire 
whether the steps for formalizing the marriage have been completed.  In 
Nabil Taiseer Hassan and Sawsan Hassan v. Eric H. Holder, Jr.,96 the 
court had to engage in this very inquiry.  In that case, Nabil and Sawsan 
Hassan, both Israeli citizens who had immigrated to the United States, 
challenged their removal from the country by the Department of 
Homeland Security.97  Nabil Hassan had entered the country as an 
unmarried child of U.S. citizen parents.98  He then married Sawsan to 
whom he was engaged.99  Sawsan Hassan had entered the United States 
on a tourist visa before her marriage.100  The Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement agent assigned to their naturalization case suspected that 
they had been married prior to their entry into the U.S. and instituted an 
investigation.101  A marriage entered prior to entry would have vitiated 
the grounds for his entry into the United States as a child of a permanent 
resident and would make him removable.102  Similarly, Sawsan’s status, 
 
C. Symeonides, Choice of Law in the American Courts in 2008: Twenty-Second Annual Survey, 57 
AM. J. COMP. L. 269, 310-313 (2009). 
 95.  Potter v. Murray City, 760 F.2d 1065, 1068 (10th Cir. 1985).  
 96.  Hassan v. Holder, 604 F.3d 915 (6th Cir. 2010). 
 97.  Id. at 917. 
 98.  Id. at 918. 
 99.  Id. 
 100.  Id. 
 101.  Id. 
 102.  Id.  The government’s allegations were the following: 
On May 23, 2002, the government served Nabil Hassan with a Notice to Appear 
(“NTA”), alleging that: (1) he had married Sawsan before entering the United States; (2) 
the marriage automatically revoked his visa under 8 C.F.R. § 205.1(a)(3)(i)(I); and (3) he 
was removable under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(A) because he was actually an inadmissible 
alien at the time of his entry into the country. Because Sawsan’s immigration status was 
based on Nabil’s status, the government also issued an NTA to Sawsan alleging that she 
too was removable for lacking a valid immigration visa.  The government later added 
two other charges of deportability to Nabil’s NTA, including that he was removable 
under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(3)(D) as an alien who falsely represented himself as a U.S. 
citizen for any purpose or benefit under the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) or 
any other federal or state law.  This additional charge was based on an allegation that on 
March 27, 2001 and May 16, 2001, Nabil falsely represented himself as a U.S. citizen on 
a Small Business Administration loan application form.  Petitioners denied the pertinent 
allegations, including the claim that they had married prior to their entry in the United 
States.   
19
Choudhury: Shari'ah Law
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2013
ARTICLE 2 - CHOUDHURY (DO NOT DELETE) 4/4/2013  4:12 PM 
68 AKRON LAW REVIEW [46:49 
dependent on her husband’s, would also be jeopardized. 
The investigation required the government to ascertain whether the 
Hassans had been married in Israel or in the United States. 
The validity of a marriage is determined by the law of the place of 
celebration.  Matter of Luna, 18 I. & N. Dec. 385, 386 (BIA 1983).  
Pursuant to Israeli law, the Sharia courts (and Sharia law) control 
personal status matters of Muslims residing in Jerusalem.  Matter of 
Darwish, 14 I. & N. Dec. 307, 308(BIA 1973).103 
Given that Israeli law states that religious laws of each religious 
community govern family law matters, it would be impossible to 
determine whether the marriage is valid without referring to shari’ah.104  
In this case, the immigration judge heard evidence from an Islamic cleric 
to determine whether the marriage had been conducted in Israel.105  
Similarly, a court hearing a matter concerning an Israeli Jewish couple 
under the same circumstances would rely on the testimony of a rabbi and 
Jewish law to make the same determination because family law is, in 
fact, religious law.106  Yet, the proponents of the anti-shari’ah measure 
emphasize the fact that the court relied on similar testimony about 
shari’ah, implying the very mention of its use is an example of the 
pernicious influence of shari’ah law in state courts.107 
It is unclear what proponents of the anti-shari’ah measures would 
suggest as the alternative to using foreign law in such a case.  Would the 
court be required to substitute alternative law, presumably U.S. state 
law, as a neutral secular yardstick?  And how would we apply such a 
yardstick in legal and cultural context entirely foreign?  The possibility 
that longstanding marriages would be given no recognition is an 
absurdity.  In addition to those whose marriages have been solemnized 
abroad, couples married in religious ceremonies within the United States 
would also face a similar problem unless they can show that their 
religious marriage conformed to civil standards.  In most states, a 
marriage requires two procedural elements: a license and a ceremony.108  
The state provides the license to marry, however, the ceremony can 
 
Id. 
 103.  Id. at 925. 
 104.  Id. at 925 n.7. 
 105.  Id. at 918. 
 106.  S.A. v. K.F., No. XX/09, 2009 WL 212566, at *11 (N.Y. App. Div. Jan. 28, 2009). 
 107.  Press Release, Am. Pub. Policy Alliance Spokesman Stephen M. Gelé, Gelé statement 
responding to CAIR-MI Attacks on Am. Laws for Am. Courts, Am. Pub. Policy (Aug. 16, 2011), 
available at http://publicpolicyalliance.org/?page_id=586. 
 108.  Mitchell Waldman, Ceremonial marriage, AM. J. JURIS. § 13 (2011). 
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either be secular or religious.109  The result of enforcing laws that seek to 
ban shari’ah in state courts may be a state-imposed secular ceremony.  
While this may be acceptable to many, it is difficult to argue that 
shari’ah could be singled out as a “foreign law” as the drafters of the 
legislation seek to do: Hindu, Jewish, Catholic, and even some 
Protestant ceremonies would also be suspect as they are “foreign” 
imports.110 
B. Divorce 
While entry into marriage may be relatively simple both 
substantively and procedurally, divorce with its effects on property and 
children, is far more complicated.  Some forms of Islamic divorce have 
been subjects of ongoing contention.  The recognition of instantaneous, 
extra-judicial and unilateral divorce as a male prerogative has been the 
focus of much feminist activism within the majority-Muslim 
countries.111  This form of divorce allows a Muslim male to unilaterally 
pronounce a divorce upon his wife and, thereby, dissolve the 
marriage.112  While some interpretations of this form of divorce have 
attempted to restrict it, as it functions in many states, it is an unfettered 
right, leaving Muslim wives vulnerable to arbitrary divorce.113  Muslim 
feminist activists have argued that this form of divorce is so abused that 
it should not be recognized by the state.114  In the United States, courts 
have refused to recognize such divorces because of these substantive and 
procedural inequities that are well theorized and described by Muslims 
themselves. 
The procedural problems are well illustrated in Aleem v. Aleem.115  
In that case, Irfan Aleem and Farah Aleem had been married in Pakistan 
in 1980 after which they moved to the United States. 116  The husband 
was employed by the World Bank.  They had two U.S. citizen children, 
 
 109.  Id. 
 110.  H.B. 2582, 50th Leg., 1st Sess. § 12-181(F)(3) (Ariz. 2011). 
 111.  Ida Lichter, Misogyny in the Muslim World: Bound by Culture or Religion?, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 7, 2011), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ida-lichter-md/misogyny-bound-
by-culture_b_803942.html. 
 112.  Aleem v. Aleem, 947 A.2d 489, 500, 501 (Md. 2008). 
 113.  See, e.g., M.A. QURESHI, MUSLIM LAW OF MARRIAGE, DIVORCE AND MAINTENANCE 
205-208 (1995). 
 114.  See Manjari Mishra, Move to Counter Triple Talak, Halala, TIMES OF INDIA (Mar. 8, 
2011, 4:44 AM IST) http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2011-03-08/india/28667986_1_tripl
e-talaq-muslim-women-shaista-ambar.  
 115.  947 A.2d 489. 
 116.  Id. at 494. 
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and Mrs. Aleem was a permanent resident of the U.S. and a domiciliary 
of Maryland.117  When the relationship broke down, the husband went to 
the Pakistani Embassy and executed a unilateral divorce of his wife, 
Farah Aleem.118  Subsequently, the substantial property which had been 
accumulated during the marriage became a subject of controversy.119  
Their marriage contract was silent with regard to property settlement and 
there was no premarital agreement.120  Mr. Aleem argued that the 
property should be settled pursuant to Pakistani law.121  Citing the lack 
of due process afforded to the wife, the inequality of rights in divorce 
between men and women in direct contravention to the Maryland Equal 
Rights Amendment and Maryland’s public policy of preserving property 
rights in absence of an agreement, the Maryland court refused to 
recognize the divorce and apply Pakistani law to the property 
distribution.122  The court spent a great deal of its opinion on the issue of 
comity.  It explained that while foreign laws are to be given comity, 
there are exceptions and limits to this general preference.  If a law from 
a foreign jurisdiction contravenes the public policy of the forum, a court 
 
 117.  Id.  
 118.  Id. at 490. 
 119.  Id. 
 120.  Id. at 491. 
 121.  Id. at 490. 
 122.  Id. at 500-501. 
On November 7, 1972, the people of Maryland ratified the Equal Rights Amendment, 
now found as Article 46 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights.  It provides “Equality of 
rights under the law shall not be abridged or denied because of sex.” Md. Const. 
Declaration of Rights, art. 46.  Accordingly, in the first instance, the enforceability of a 
foreign talaq divorce provision, such as that presented here, in the courts of Maryland, 
where only the male, i.e., husband, has an independent right to utilize talaq and the wife 
may utilize it only with the husband’s permission, is contrary to Maryland’s 
constitutional provision 13 and thus is contrary to the “public policy” of Maryland.  
The talaq divorce of countries applying Islamic law, unless substantially modified, is 
contrary to the public policy of this state and we decline to give talaq, as it is presented 
in this case, any comity.  The Pakistani statutes providing that property owned by the 
parties to a marriage, follows title upon the dissolution of the marriage unless there are 
agreements otherwise, conflicts with the laws of this State w here, in the absence of valid 
agreements otherwise or in the absence of waiver, marital property is subject to fair and 
equitable division.  Thus the Pakistani statutes are wholly in conflict with the public 
policy of this State as expressed in our statutes and we shall afford no comity to those 
Pakistani statutes. 
Additionally, a procedure that permits a man (and him only unless he agrees otherwise) 
to evade a divorce action begun in this State by rushing to the embassy of a country 
recognizing talaq and, without prior notice to the wife, perform “I divorce thee . . .” 
three times and thus summarily terminate the marriage and deprive his wife of marital 
property, confers insufficient due process to his wife.  Accordingly, for this additional 
reason the courts of Maryland shall not recognize the talaq divorce performed here. 
Id. at 500-501, 502. 
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may refuse comity.123  Moreover, the Full Faith and Credit clause of 
Article IV §1 of the U.S. Constitution does not apply to foreign 
judgments; therefore, there is no automatic expectation of comity.124 
In Aleem, the court declined to give the law of Pakistan, which is 
based on shari’ah, comity.125  It did so because the application of that 
law would deprive Mrs. Aleem of almost all the procedural protections 
provided her by Maryland law, including the right to be heard on the 
matter of the divorce.126  As the court noted, prior decisions have made 
clear that laws that contravene the public policy of the forum cannot be 
afforded comity.  What ought to be obvious is the necessary step 
involved in order to ascertain whether Pakistani law ought to be given 
comity.  That is, the courts had to examine the laws of the foreign 
jurisdiction and decide whether they conflict.  Given that a large number 
of majority-Muslim countries and even some non-Muslim countries, like 
Israel and India, retain religious law in domestic relations, evaluating 
these laws is not an uncommon occurrence.127  However, application or 
enforcement of that law is always restrained by public policy and the 
 
 123.  Id. at 498. 
 124.  Id. at 499. 
 125.  Id. at 502. 
 126.  It should be noted that ex parte divorces, where one spouse obtains a divorce decree in a 
foreign jurisdiction without the appearance of the other spouse, are an ongoing practice in the 
United States.  However, most jurisdictions require that the non-appearing spouse be given notice of 
the action, and in many cases, if the party is not resident of the jurisdiction or both parties did not 
appear, comity is not afforded to the decree. See RANDY FRANCES KANDEL, FAMILY LAW, 
ESSENTIAL TERMS AND CONCEPTS 91-92 (2000).  See also Divorce Abroad, TRAVEL.STATE.Gov, 
available at http://travel.state.gov/law/family_issues/divorce/divorce_592.html (last visited Jan. 18, 
2013). 
A divorce decree issued in a foreign country generally is recognized in a state in the United States 
on the basis of comity provided both parties to the divorce received adequate notice, i.e., service of 
process and, generally, provided one of the parties was a domiciliary in the foreign nation at the 
time of the divorce.  See Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1895).  Under the principle of 
comity, a divorce obtained in another country under the circumstances described above receives 
“full faith and credit” in all other states and countries that recognize divorce.  Although full faith 
and credit may be given to an ex parte divorce decree, states usually consider the jurisdictional basis 
upon which the foreign decree is founded and may withhold full faith and credit if not satisfied 
regarding domicile in the foreign country.  Many state courts which have addressed the question of 
a foreign divorce where both parties participate in the divorce proceedings but neither obtains 
domicile there have followed the view that such a divorce invalid.  See Weber v. Weber, 265 N.W. 
2d 436 (Neb. 1978); Everett v. Everett, 345 So.2d 586 (La. Ct. App. 1977); Kugler v. Haitian Tours, 
Inc., 293 A.2d 706 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1972); Estate of Steffke v. Wisconsin Department of Revenue, 
222 N.W.2d 628 (Wis. 1974); Commonwealth v. Doughty, 144 A.2d 521 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1958); 
Bobala v. Bobala, 33 N.E.2d 845 (Ohio Ct. App. 1940); Golden v. Golden, 68 P.2d 928 (N.M. 
1937).   
 127.  See Hassan v. Holder, 604 F.3d 915 (6th Cir. 2010); Maddireddy v. Maddireddy, 886 
N.Y.S.2d 495, 496 (N.Y. App. Div. 2009). 
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laws of the United States.128  Aleem v. Aleem is an example of the system 
functioning as it should.  The Maryland court required no statutory 
guidance by way of an anti-shari’ah law to conclude that this particular 
form of divorce seriously violates the rights of one party.  It is difficult 
to see how this case is an example of the infiltration of shari’ah as an 
ideology into the U.S. judiciary.  More importantly, while in this case 
the anti-shari’ah or anti-foreign law provisions would provide a short cut 
to the result, it would have entirely different results in ex-parte divorces 
undertaken in foreign jurisdictions. 
For instance, if Mr. Aleem had gone to Haiti and received a quick 
divorce there and returned to the United States, his divorce would be 
recognized as long as Mrs. Aleem had been given notice of the 
proceeding.129  Moreover, the U.S. courts would take jurisdiction over 
property and child support matters and would have ongoing jurisdiction 
over child custody matters.  Given that Haiti’s law would be applied to 
the divorce, in order to give it comity, the U.S. court would have to 
consider130 it and implement131 it.  Such reliance would appear to be 
barred by the anti-foreign law measures. 
C. Child Custody 
Child custody matters in the United States require the ongoing 
supervision of courts in order to ensure that children’s interests are 
protected.132  Under Islamic law, child custody follows what might be 
construed as a combination of the “tender years” doctrine and the 
Roman conception of patria potestas.133  That is to say, that upon 
divorce, children of a young age are left with the mother until they reach 
a certain age at which time the father gains custody.134  This rule differs 
a great deal from the “best interest of the child” standard applicable in 
U.S. courts.135  Current standards no longer rely on a bright line rule that 
 
 128.  See Sheldon Shapiro, Valid judgment of court of foreign country as entitled to 
extraterritorial effect in federal district court, 13 A.L.R. FED. 208 § 5(a) (2011). 
 129.  Guyot, 159 U.S. at 163-64. 
 130.  See supra note 127 and accompanying text. 
 131.  See supra note 128 and accompanying text. 
 132.  See Kandel supra note 126, at 145, 157. 
 133.  See Islamic Perspective on Child Custody after Divorce, ISLAMIC SHARIA COUNCIL, 
http://www.islamic-sharia.org/children/islamic-perspective-on-child-custody-after-divorce.html 
(last visited, Jan. 18, 2013). 
 134.  See KUTAIBA S. CHALEBY, FORENSIC PSYCHIATRY IN ISLAMIC JURISPRUDENCE 72-73 
(Anas Al-Shaikh-Ali ed., 2001). 
 135.  See Amin v. Bakaty, 812 So.2d 12, 28 (La. Ct. App. 2001). 
24
Akron Law Review, Vol. 46 [2013], Iss. 1, Art. 2
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol46/iss1/2
ARTICLE 2 - CHOUDHURY (DO NOT DELETE) 4/4/2013  4:12 PM 
2013] SHARI’AH LAW 73 
makes decisions on custody based on gender stereotypes.136  Rather, the 
best interest of the child is the paramount consideration.  As a result, 
child custody judgments from countries applying shari’ah laws or other 
religious laws are subject to the public policy exception when it comes 
to comity.  Moreover, no custody judgment in the United States is final; 
the determinations remain open to judicial review because of the state’s 
interest in the welfare of children.137  Child custody judgments arrived at 
in other countries are similarly open to revision by U.S. courts, including 
those that rely on shari’ah. 
A Louisiana court followed this well-established reasoning when 
deciding Amin v. Bakhaty.138  In that case, Mr. Bakhaty, a U.S. citizen 
married Ms. Amin in 1991 in Egypt.139  She gave birth to a son in 
1992.140  For six years, Ms. Amin lived in Egypt with the expectation 
that at some time she and her son would relocate to the United States.141  
Mr. Bakhaty, who had a medical practice in New York, traveled back 
and forth to Egypt to visit the family.142  After six years, Ms. Amin 
relocated herself and her son to the United States and attempted to 
contact her husband.143  Failing in this, she moved to Louisiana where 
she had family.144  When he discovered that his wife and son were in the 
U.S., Mr. Bakhaty notified them that he would come to Baton Rouge to 
meet them.145  Instead, he traveled to Egypt to begin inquiries about how 
his wife had managed to leave Egypt.146  He then brought criminal 
charges against her for removing the child from Egypt without his 
permission.147  She was convicted in absentia of these charges in 
Egypt.148 
When Ms. Amin was informed of these actions, she filed suit 
seeking a divorce, child custody, and support in the United States.149  
Almost concurrently, Mr. Bakhaty obtained a Certificate of Divorce 
 
 136.  See Charara v. Yatim, 937 N.E.2d 490, 495 (Mass. App. Ct. 2010). 
 137.  See Overman v. Overman, 629 P.2d 127, 130 (Idaho 1980). 
 138.  812 So.2d 12, 28 (La. Ct. App. 2001). 
 139.  Id. at 17. 
 140.  Id. 
 141.  Id. at 20. 
 142.  Id. at 17, 23. 
 143.  Id. at 25. 
 144.  Id. at 17. 
 145.  Id. at 20. 
 146.  Id. 
 147.  Id. at 13. 
 148.  Id. at 21-22. 
 149.  Id. at 20. 
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from Egypt.150  He then filed for a declaratory judgment of permanent 
custody of the minor child.151  Egyptian family law follows the millet 
system in which one’s religious affiliation determines the applicable 
law.152  For Muslim Egyptians, shari’ah is applied, giving children of the 
marriage to the father after they have achieved a certain age.  However, 
at the time that Mr. Bakhaty petitioned the Louisiana courts seeking 
custody of the child, there were no outstanding orders issued by any 
court.153 
In order to determine which court had jurisdiction over the child 
custody and support matters, the Louisiana courts applied the Louisiana 
Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (“UCCJA”) and the Uniform 
Interstate Family Support Act.  At the trial level, the court declined to 
recognize Egypt as a “state” under UCCJA and relied on the fourth 
grounds of residual jurisdiction to take custody of the matter.154  Further, 
it found that it had personal jurisdiction over Mr. Bakhaty because he 
had availed himself of Louisiana courts and could, therefore, expect to 
be haled into its courts.155 
Two questions arise from this case and its use in the SANE 
document as an example of the inappropriate role of shari’ah.  First, why 
did the Louisiana court refuse to recognize Egypt as a state?  Second, 
does this case represent “shari’ah creep”?  To answer the first, a brief 
discussion of the international application of the UCCJA (or the 
amended UCCJEA) is required.156  The UCCJA was enacted to assist 
courts in determining which state had jurisdiction over custody matters 
when more than one state is involved.  In cases where one of the 
possible “states” is a foreign country, the act gives discretion to the 
courts to treat that country as a “state.”  In making that determination, 
the courts examined the following factors: 
(1) whether the child custody laws of the foreign jurisdiction and those of the United 
States were similar, particularly in light of considering the best interests of the child; 
(2) whether foreign custody decrees existed prior to initiating any proceedings in the 
reviewing court; 
(3) whether any of the parties were U.S. citizens; and 
(4) whether the parties received adequate notice and a chance to be heard in the foreign 
 
 150.  Id. at 18. 
 151.  Id. at 13. 
 152.  See generally Abu-Odeh supra note 12. 
 153.  See Amin, 812 So.2d at 25. 
 154.  Id. at 19; see also Uniform Child Custody and Jurisdiction Act of 1997, § 105, 201-203 
[hereinafter “UCCJEA”]. 
 155.  See Amin, 812 So.2d at 22. 
 156.  UCCJEA. 
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forum.157 
 
Applying these factors, it is clear that both substantive (best interest of 
the child) and procedural (notice and hearing) problems were present in 
this case.  Further, a U.S. citizen father went to a foreign jurisdiction for 
the divorce and custody determination in a move that could be regarded 
as forum shopping.  The mother in this case did not flee the foreign 
jurisdiction but rather came to the U.S. in an attempt to reunite with her 
husband.  Both parties were in the United States before the divorce was 
initiated.  At the time that Ms. Amin filed for custody, no judgment 
existed determining who should take jurisdiction.  Clearly, her move to 
the United States was not made with the intention of evading the reach 
of Egyptian courts.  The assumption of jurisdiction by the Louisiana 
courts was appropriate in this case.  Moreover, the Supreme Court of 
Louisiana was careful to note that not all cases involving countries with 
codified Islamic law had the same result.  Citing a number of cases, they 
show that in some cases, foreign decrees are recognized while in others 
they are not.158  This tends to indicate that “shari’ah creep” is simply not 
occurring. 
In Hosain v. Malik,159 for example, the Court of Special Appeals of 
Maryland did give comity to a Pakistani custody decree.160  Pakistani 
law is based on shari’ah.  However, it includes consideration of the 
welfare of the minor, a standard similar to the best interest of the 
child.161  Both standards give the courts broad discretion to make 
decisions that benefit the child as opposed to upholding the rights of the 
parents.  In both jurisdictions, there is no dispositive factor that assures 
one parent the custody of the child.  Rather, a set of factors are 
considered and weighed, including the child’s religion and agreements to 
raise the child in a particular religion, his or her attachment to extended 
family and the relationship with both parents.162  The court stated: 
 
 157.  Id.  
 158.  CTR. FOR DEC. POLICY, SHARIAH LAW AND AMERICAN STATE COURTS: AN ASSESSMENT 
OF STATE APPELLATE COURT CASES 231 (Mar. 20, 2011) (citing Horlander v. Horlander, 579 
N.E.2d 91 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991); Middleton v. Middleton, 314 S.E.2d 362, 368 (Va. 1984); Hosain v. 
Malik, 671 A.2d 988, 1000 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1996); Rashid v. Drumm, 824 S.W.2d 497, 499 
(Mo. Ct. App. 1992); Malak v. Malak, 227 Cal. Rptr. 841, 846 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986); Ivaldi v. Ivaldi, 
685 A.2d 1319, 1327 (N.J. 1996)). 
 159.  671 A.2d 988. 
 160.  Id. at 1003. 
 161.  Id. at 991. 
 162.  See Kandel supra note 126, at 146; see also Hosain, 671 A.2d at 997 (discussing 
Guardians and Wards Act of 1992). 
The evidence was overwhelming that, as a general principle, Pakistan follows the best 
27
Choudhury: Shari'ah Law
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2013
ARTICLE 2 - CHOUDHURY (DO NOT DELETE) 4/4/2013  4:12 PM 
76 AKRON LAW REVIEW [46:49 
Significantly, this case is not about this Court undertaking the task of 
acting as a fact finder in place of the circuit court or substituting its 
judgment for that of the Pakistani court.  And, this case is not about 
whether Pakistani religion, culture, or legal system is personally 
offensive to us or whether we share all of the same values, mores and 
customs, but rather whether the Pakistani courts applied a rule of law, 
evidence or procedure so contrary to Maryland public policy as to 
undermine the confidence in the trial.163 
The Maryland court found that the Pakistani court had, indeed, applied 
the welfare of the minor standard and that Ms. Hosain had been given 
notice and an opportunity to be heard of which she failed to avail 
herself.164  Substantively, the preference given to fathers in Islamic law 
(where it is a preference as opposed to a mandate) is similar to the 
maternal preference that was common in U.S. courts well into the 1970s.  
Moreover, statistics show that that preference is still at work.165  
Furthermore, the court recognizes that the law does not operate in a 
cultural vacuum.  In order to determine what the best interest of a child 
is, the trial court must do so within the cultural context in which it 
operates.  So, if a parent’s morality is a factor to be weighed, that factor 
can only be given meaning through the mores of the society in which the 
factor is applied.166  To argue otherwise would be to assert that there is 
an objective morality or a neutral moral code that travels easily from one 
 
interest of the child test in making child custody decisions.  Both experts testified that 
the Guardians & Wards Act of 1890 applies to child custody disputes. Section 7 of the 
Act authorizes a court to appoint a guardian for a child where “the Court is satisfied that 
it is for the welfare of a minor . . . .” GUARDIANS AND WARDS ACT § 7 (1992). Section 
17 of the Act, in pertinent part, states: 
In appointing or declaring the guardian of the minor, the Court shall, subject to the 
provisions of this section, be guided by what, consistently with the law to which the 
minor is subject, appears in the circumstances to be for the welfare of the minor. 
In considering what will be for the welfare of the minor, the Court shall have regard to 
the age, sex and religion of the minor, the character and capacity of the proposed 
guardian and his nearness of kin to the minor, the wishes, if any, of a deceased parent, 
and any existing or previous relations of the proposed guardian with the minor or his 
property. 
If the minor is old enough to form an intelligent preference, the Court may consider that 
preference. 
GUARDIANS AND WARDS ACT § 17 (1992).   
Id. 
 163.  See Hosain, 671 A.2d at 997. 
 164.  Id. at 1000. 
 165.  See Custodial Mothers and Fathers and Their Child Support: 2001, U.S. CENSUS, 
available at http://www2.census.gov/prod2/popscan/p60-225.pdf (last visited, Jan. 24, 2013) (five 
out of six custodial parents or approximately eighty-four percent were mothers).   
 166.  See Hosain, 671 A.2d at 1000. 
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location to the next and is knowable without any cultural baggage.  
Acknowledging that the Pakistani court made its determination “utilizing 
the customs, culture, religion, and mores of the community and country 
of which the child and—in this case—her parents were a part”167 is 
stating the obvious. 
Clearly, there is no special deference given to foreign laws based on 
codifications of shari’ah, nor is there any particular discrimination 
against those laws.  Malik’s result is attributable to the Maryland court’s 
recognition of substantive and procedural similarities in Pakistani law 
that caused no conflict with Maryland law.  Bakhaty, on the other hand, 
was a much different case in which a U.S. citizen sought to apply 
foreign laws that were at odds with Louisiana law.  In matters of 
custody, Egyptian family law relies on gender stereotypes about child 
rearing and parentage in a way that U.S. law has attempted to move 
beyond.168  In the United States, a child does not “belong” to his or her 
father’s family, nor does a mother automatically become the primary 
custodian based on her gender.  The primary consideration is the child’s 
welfare.  And it is permissible for a court to consider all the facts and 
circumstances of the case before it makes its determination.  
Consideration of religion, culture, the manner in which a child has been 
raised, and the effects of change in a transnational dispute is essential.169  
Rather than being instances of the application of shari’ah, these cases are 
prime examples of how the U.S. legal system works efficiently to 
accommodate decrees from foreign jurisdictions while adhering to the 
principle of supremacy of the laws and policy preferences of the United 
States.  It is an example of a system that works.  If the anti-shari’ah 
measures were implemented, such in-depth inquiry would certainly be 
replaced in favor of the blanket assumption that all applications of 
shari’ah fail to reach a just outcome. 
D. Private Marital Agreements 
Marital agreements, governed by contract law, are given more 
deference in state courts regardless of their religious origin if it can be 
shown that they conform to neutral contract law standards.  As such, 
mahr agreements (agreements for the payment of dower) that are part of 
a Muslim marriage are put on the same footing as prenuptial agreements 
 
 167.  Id.  
 168.  Amin v. Bakaty, 812 So.2d 12, 25 (La. Ct. App. 2001). 
 169.  See, e.g., Shauna Van Praugh, Religion, Custody, and a Child’s Identities, 35 OSGOODE 
HALL L.J. 309 (1997). 
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or simple contracts and are typically given force.170  Dower agreements 
memorialize the obligation to pay the wife consideration for entering the 
marriage.171  One common interpretation of this requirement is that it 
provides financial security for the wife in the event that the marriage 
fails.172  The dower is separate property belonging to the wife alone, and 
it is often the only property she received upon divorce.173 
One of the most prominent cases dealing with mahr agreements is 
Odatalla v. Odatalla.174  Zuhair Odatalla, the husband, challenged the 
validity of the mahr agreement entered into at the time of marriage “on 
two grounds: (1) the First Amendment to the Constitution precluding 
this court’s authority to review the Mahr Agreement under the separation 
of Church and State Doctrine and (2) the agreement is not a valid 
contract under New Jersey law.”175  The key issue was whether contracts 
entered for religious reasons and pursuant to religious laws might be 
enforced by civil courts.  The problem that these religiously based 
contracts present is that they may give rise to excessive entanglement if 
the court is required to evaluate the religious principles underlying the 
contract.  However, as the court states in Odatalla, where there are 
neutral principles of law that can be applied to evaluate the contract, the 
civil courts may consider such contracts without violating the 
Constitution.176  Indeed, the enforcement of these contracts is a part of 
the free exercise guarantee: “the Mahr Agreement is not void simply 
because it was entered into during an Islamic ceremony of marriage.  
Rather, enforcement of the secular parts of a written agreement is 
consistent with the constitutional mandate for a ‘free exercise’ of 
religious beliefs, no matter how diverse they may be.”177 
In order to settle the matter at bar, the New Jersey court examined 
 
 170.  See Akileh v. Elchahal, 666 So. 2d 246 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996), Aziz v. Aziz, 488 
N.Y.S.2d 123 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1985). 
 171.  Lindsey E. Blenkhorn, Note, Islamic Marriage Contracts in American Courts: 
Interpreting Mahr Agreements as Prenuptials and their Effect on Muslim Women, 76 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 189, 199 (2002) (citing JAMAL J. NASIR, THE STATUS OF WOMEN UNDER ISLAMIC LAW AND 
UNDER MODERN ISLAMIC LEGISLATION 28 (1990)).  
 172.  Chelsea A. Sizemore, Enforcing Islamic Mahr Agreements: The American Judge’s 
Interpretational Dilemma, 18 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1085, 1088 (citing Blenkhorn, supra, note 171, 
at 210-11).  
 173.  See Blenkhorn, supra note 171, at 201-202. 
 174.  Odatalla v. Odatalla, 810 A.2d 93 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. 2002). 
 175.  Id. at 95. 
 176.  Id. at 97.  See also In re Marriage of Goldman, 554 N.E.2d 1016 (Ill. App. 1990) 
(recognizing marriage contract in Jewish marriage); In re Marriage of Bereznak & Heminger, 2 Cal. 
Rptr. 3d 351 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003) (enforcing binding arbitration in marriage contract). 
 177.  Odatalla, 810 A.2d at 97. 
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the contract that called for the immediate payment of one gold coin 
(prompt mahr) and $10,000 in payment at a later time (deferred mahr) 
and the evidence showing the parties entered into the agreement 
freely.178  In a videotape of the marriage ceremony, Zuhair gave the 
bride, Houida, a gold coin “confirming his intention to be bound by the 
Mahr Agreement.”179  Zuhair’s arguments that the contract was 
unenforceable because it was too vague, that it constituted a gift, or was 
void for public policy reasons were unavailing.180  Justice Selser 
construed the agreement as “nothing more and nothing less than a simple 
contract between two consenting adults.”181  All the elements of a 
traditional contract were present. 
Mahr agreements have not always been upheld.  However, similarly 
the reasons for their unenforceability have had nothing to do with 
religion but rather with their characterization.  In Habibi-Fahnrich v. 
Fahnrich,182 the couple had been married for less than a year when the 
marriage broke down.  The Muslim wife sought to enforce the mahr 
agreement which the parties agreed to: 1) a ring advanced and 2) half of 
the husband’s property postponed.  The court held that this agreement 
was insufficiently precise because it failed the test “that anyone reading 
the contract should be able to understand the dictates of the agreement.”  
Moreover, there was insufficient evidence that both parties agreed to the 
terms of the contract.183  In Shaban v. Shaban,184 a California court 
found a mahr agreement unenforceable for similar reasons.  In that case, 
the mahr agreement was for a dollar at the time of marriage and about 
thirty dollars in deferred mahr.  At divorce, the wife claimed her share of 
the community property of more than $3 million.  The husband claimed 
that the agreement meant that the wife had consented to the separate 
property regime that is the default in Islamic divorce.  However, the 
court found that the agreement did not satisfy the Statute of Frauds. 
 
 178.  Id. at 95.  There are two types of mahr that can be agreed to at the time of marriage.  
Prompt mahr is payable at the time of marriage whereas deferred mahr is payable at a later time or 
on the occurrence of a particular event such as divorce. 
 179.  Id. at 97. 
 180.  Id. at 98. 
 181.  Id.  In an earlier Florida case, Akileh v. Elchahal, the trial court found that the mahr 
agreement was not enforceable for lack of consideration.  The holding was later overturned on 
appeal.  The appellate court found that marriage was sufficient consideration for the contract to be 
valid.  As a result, the wife was due the $50,000 agreed to in the agreement.  See Akileh v. Elchahal, 
666 So. 2d 246, 248-249 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996). 
 182.  Habibi-Fahnrich v. Fahnrich, No. 46186/93, 1995 WL 507388 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. July 10, 
1995). 
 183.  Id. at *3. 
 184.  In re Marriage of Sheban, 105 Cal. Rptr. 2d 863 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001). 
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As Pascale Fournier has shown, U.S. courts apply a liberal-formal 
equality approach to adjudicating mahr agreements: 
[T]he secular conception of this religious institution: deprived of its 
Islamic flavor . . . becomes a (Western) contract enforceable (or not) 
irrespective of race, gender or religion.  In capturing mahr under the 
umbrella of Western contract law, as opposed to Islamic family law, 
the judge pictures the liberal system as devoid of a representative role 
for the Muslim-ness of the parties.  Contract law, the judge assumes, is 
not a matter of identity politics.185 
As such, at least in the adjudication of mahr as contract/prenuptial 
agreement, religion is conspicuously avoided as a factor to be considered 
in interpretation.  The inquiry centers on whether the agreements meet 
the criteria for a contract under common law principles rather than 
shari’ah principles.  Moreover, similar contracts are upheld when there 
are no religious traditions or different religious traditions involved.186  In 
sum, these cases are also unpersuasive examples of shari’ah creep.  
Rather, they are the opposite, they demonstrate the application of secular 
law over religious law even where religious contracts are at the heart of 
the controversy. 
SANE and the proponents of anti-shari’ah laws assert that, through 
family law and the accommodation of practicing Muslims in our judicial 
system, shari’ah has gained a foothold and now threatens our 
constitutional rights.  These fairly straightforward family law cases are 
cited in the SANE literature as examples of shari’ah creep that will 
ultimately lead to an overthrow of our secular legal system.187  For most 
legal academics, such claims are clearly overblown political posturing 
that can be easily ignored at least until they become law.  Moreover, the 
cases themselves do nothing to support such a claim.  Rather they are 
evidence of the sensible approach to comity developed over time by our 
legal system.  However, what ought not to be lost in the move to dismiss 
these arguments are the social effects of these laws and the ongoing 
construction of Islam as a threat to “our” way of life—even as mere 
legal proposals or laws that ultimately fail—on Muslims. 
 
 185.  PASCALE FOURNIER, MUSLIM MARRIAGE IN WESTERN COURTS: LOST IN 
TRANSPLANTATION 90-91 (2010). 
 186.  See, e.g., Mallen v. Mallen, 622 S.E.2d 812 (Ga. 2005) (upholding the enforcement of a 
prenuptial agreement); see also Avitzur v. Avitzur, 58 N.Y.2d 108 (1983) (enforcing a Jewish 
ketubah requiring husband to submit to the Beth Din, a nonjudicial forum that would have no 
impact on the civil divorce). 
 187.  See SANE supra note 89. 
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IV. THREATS TO NATIONAL IDENTITY OR NATIONAL SECURITY? 
If anti-shari’ah measures are a solution in search of a problem, then 
what is their true purpose?188  How have these laws achieved the level of 
support they enjoy?  Does their ineffectiveness in preventing national 
security threats make them nonetheless anodyne?  What effects might 
these laws have on the lives of ordinary Muslims?  These are the 
difficult questions that this section takes up.  I contend that in large part 
these legislative maneuvers are a reflection of a political and social 
agenda that links the global terrorist “enemy” and all Muslims in the 
United States and seeks to maintain the distribution of legal and social 
power that prefers imagined “real” Americans.189  In other words, there 
is an anxiety about identity, change, and “American-ness” threatened by 
an increasingly diverse nation with more visible and powerful minority 
individuals that has given rise to a retrenchment of dominant power.190  
Moreover, it is not simply an American phenomenon as the recent events 
in Norway and the ongoing debates in Switzerland, France, and Holland 
have shown.191 
In the case of the United States, two strands of analysis must be 
undertaken to fully appreciate the legal and social import of these 
laws.192  The first strand is one that answers the methodology question: 
how is the “enemy” constructed?  I argue below that the creation of the 
 
 188.  I take this phrase from Jamil Dakwar & Daniel Mach, Anti-Sharia Law: A Solution in 
Search Of A Problem, HUFFINGTON POST (May 20, 2011, 2:55 PM ET), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/05/20/anti-sharia-law-a-solutio_n_864389.html. 
 189.  This move is paralleled in the construction of Latino communities as outsiders and the 
reemergence of racisms against African Americans particularly in the aftermath of the election of 
Barack Obama and converges to form a concerted social, political and legal effort to circumscribe 
the identity boundaries.  See generally EDIBERTO ROMAN, CITIZENSHIP AND ITS EXCLUSIONS: A 
CLASSICAL, CONSTITUTIONAL, AND CRITICAL RACE CRITIQUE (2010); see also RANDALL 
KENNEDY, THE PERSISTENCE OF THE COLOR LINE: RACIAL POLITICS AND THE OBAMA PRESIDENCY 
(2011). 
 190.  See Robert Steinback, Jihad Against Islam, supra note 16.  
 191.  See John Esposito, Norway attacks a wakeup call for a world, WASHINGTON POST: ON 
FAITH (July 30, 2011, 7:27 AM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/on-faith/post/norway-
attacks-a-wakeup-call-for-a-world/2011/07/29/gIQAZ4N4iI_blog.html.  See also JOAN WALLACH 
SCOTT, POLITICS OF THE VEIL (2007) (discussing the veil ban in France); Lorenz Langer, Panacea 
or Pathetic Fallacy?: The Swiss Ban on Minarets, 43 VAND. J. OF TRANS. L. 863 (2010). 
 192.  In Globalizing the Margins, I examined the ways in which the linkage works in one 
direction, with the U.S. defining Muslims and Islam within its domestic borders, regulating Muslims 
within these spatial boundaries.  I recognized in that piece that the production and traffic of identity 
and regulation is a two way street.  I chose to focus on one direction—the local to the global.  I must 
thank Lama Abu-Odeh and Jorge Esquirol for reminding me of this linkage.  See Cyra Akila 
Choudhury, Globalizing the Margins: Legal Exiles in the War on Terror and Liberal Feminism’s 
War for Muslim Women, 9 INT’L REV. OF CONSTITUTIONALISM 241 (2010) [hereinafter 
“Globalizing the Margins”]. 
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enemy is an ongoing domestic attempt to confine and expel deceitful, 
“dangerous” people and to define “real” Americans.  It is an attempt to 
draw the boundaries of identity tightly enough to clearly reject certain 
undesirables from the community of people that national security law 
seeks to protect.  The domestic threat borrows heavily from a global 
(re)definition of terrorists (that is then conflated with any Muslim as 
potential or proto-terrorist) as “subhuman.”  That definition revives old 
colonial justifications for the application of special laws to the 
“backward” races and their removal from the protection of “ordinary 
law.”193 
The effects of the creation of the enemy are the second thread of the 
analysis.  This thread examines the real effects of these laws geared to 
disciplining and expelling the enemy.  The two strands brought together 
provide a more robust account of the dissemination of Islamophobia and 
the justifications for the need to regulate Muslims through law and 
legalized violence.  Moreover, they underscore the traffic between the 
local and global in the War on Terror and both their intended and 
unintended effects.194  It is also important to recognize the dialectical 
relationship between some causes and some effects, whereby the effects 
themselves reify the causes. 
The purpose of examining these two strands is to call into question 
the very definition and identity of the “enemy” and to highlight the costs 
borne by those who are conscripted into this role.  But it is not only the 
travails of ordinary Muslims captured in the dragnet that concerns me, it 
is also the distractions that these laws targeting minorities cause and the 
damage they could do to more effective national security approaches.  In 
the following sections, I attempt to lay out some of the methods and 
strategies by which the threat is constructed and their effects in both 
local and global spaces.195 
 
 193.  See generally Y.G.-M. LULAT, UNITED STATES RELATIONS WITH SOUTH AFRICA: A 
CRITICAL OVERVIEW FROM THE COLONIAL PERIOD TO THE PRESENT 539 (2008); EDWARD SAID, 
ORIENTALISM (1979); EDWARD SAID, CULTURE AND IMPERIALISM (1994); Michael Brett, 
Legislating for Inequality in Algeria: The Senatus-Consulte of 14 July 1865, 51 BULL. SCH. OF 
ORIENTAL & AFR. STUD. 440-461 (1988); see also Cheryl B. Welch, Colonial Violence and the 
Rhetoric of Evasion: Tocqueville on Algeria, 31 POL. THEORY 235 (2003). 
 194.  Some have argued that the core/periphery distinction that is upheld by borders has 
collapsed.  There is some evidence for this as the 9/11 Commission Report shows.  See THE 
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES, THE 9/11 
COMMISSION REPORT 517 (2004).   
 195.  In the next section, I attempt to discover the strategies that are used to create the Muslim 
as enemy followed by a discussion of the effects of those strategies in regulating the enemy.  It is 
not always possible to identify what is a cause and what is an effect; to some extent, the 
construction of these as separate is artificial and can be contested.   
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A. Methodology: Strategies in Creating the Enemy 
There are numerous discursive strategies that can be used to 
construct a national enemy.196  Extensive research has been conducted 
on propaganda and public dissemination of particular kinds of 
stereotyping in order to bolster claims about a group that purportedly 
threatens national identity and security.197  From the turn of the last 
century into the new millennium, such methods have been used to define 
the Bolshevik threat, the Jewish threat, the anti-colonial or nationalist 
threat, the integrationist/racial threat.198  The “Muslim-as-terrorist-fifth-
column” threat shares in this dismal history.199  All of these have 
commonalities in the way that they became national security threats.  In 
this section, I want to focus on three specific methods in the Muslim 
context: assuming the power to redefine the values or beliefs of the 
subject; stereotyping the subject; and finally, applying a set of “special” 
laws that has the dialectical consequence of both creating and 
maintaining the enemy. 
1. Capturing the Discourse: Islam Resignified 
Being able to represent oneself in one’s own words is critical to any 
project of self-definition and emancipation.  If the ordinary language that 
a people use to give voice to their lives, values, and aspirations is twisted 
and redefined, it makes expression of these difficult.  The assumption of 
the power to define is a classic tool in the arsenal of dominating powers 
from the first colonizers until the War on Terror.200  Increasingly, it has 
become difficult for Muslims to use familiar terms with well-accepted 
meanings to express ideas because of the way that these terms have been 
 
 196.  See EVA HERSCHINGER, CONSTRUCTING GLOBAL ENEMIES: HEGEMONY AND IDENTITY 
IN INTERNATIONAL DISCOURSES ON TERRORISM AND DRUG PROHIBITION 33-59 (2011). 
 197.  See SUSAN BACHRACH AND STEVEN LUCKERT, STATE OF DECEPTION: THE POWER OF 
NAZI PROPAGANDA (2009); Richard Jackson, Constructing Enemies: “Islamic Terrorism” in 
Political and Academic Discourse, 42 GOV’T & OPPOSITION: AN INT’L J. OF COMP. POL. 394-426 
(2007); NOAM CHOMSKY, MEDIA CONTROL: THE SPECTACULAR ACHIEVEMENTS OF PROPAGANDA 
(2002). 
 198.  See supra notes 192-93. 
 199. See Yonat Shimron, Islamic Terrorism Threat May Be Overblown, Expert Says, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 9, 2011, 7:23 PM ET), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/08/09/
islamic-terrorism-overblown_n_922757.html; John Esposito, Violent ‘Muslims’ distort the tradition, 
WASH. POST BLOG (July 14, 2010, 9:27 AM ET), http://newsweek.washingtonpost.com/onfaith/
panelists/john_esposito/2010/07/violent_muslims_distort_the_tradition.html. 
 200.  See generally EDWARD SAID, ORIENTALISM, supra note 193, discussing the creation of 
distorted knowledge about the “orient” by colonial experts who sought to understand the natives 
that they were to govern). 
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captured and resignified for political purposes. 
A number of redefinitions are now in currency; for example, jihad, 
which has had positive connotations as an internal struggle of spirituality 
or a sanctioned external struggle against occupation,201 has now become 
synonymous with terror or anti-Western violence.202  Indeed, it has 
spurred the creation of a set of neologisms such as jihadist and jihadism 
to complete the resignification of the term into a synonym for terror.203  
Similarly, Madrassa has gone from simply meaning “school” to 
indoctrination center where children are taught to hate the West and 
wage jihad.204  The educational programs in any school in the United 
States or anywhere else can be radically delegitimized by simply calling 
them madrassas, carrying with it the implication that these are jihadi 
training centers.205  These are perhaps the most obvious and common 
examples of words resignified.  But increasingly, ideologues are 
resorting to the Internet and relying on the newly redefined terms coined 
by those with little or no knowledge of Islam or its jurisprudence.  These 
self-appointed gatekeepers have begun to capture more concepts, 
decontextualizing them and redirecting their meanings.206  Below are 
some examples of this trend. 
Dhimmi meant “protected peoples” in Islamic societies; the 
concept, long dead after the rise of the state and the experience of 
colonization and secularization, has been revived to provide support for 
the idea that non-Muslims are discriminated against in Islam.207  Hence, 
 
 201.  DAVID COOK, UNDERSTANDING JIHAD 32-48 (2005). 
 202.  It has even spurred the creation of neologisms like “jihadi” or “jihadism.”  See, e.g., 
“Jihadist,” MIRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, available at http://www.merriam-webster.com/
dictionary/jihadist (last visited, Jan 19, 2013). 
 203.  Roxanne L. Euben, Jihad and Political Violence, CURRENT HIST., Nov. 2002, at 365-366. 
 204.  See generally Peter Bergen & Swati Pandey, The Madrassa Scapegoat, 29 WASH. Q. 2, 
115-125 (2006). 
 205.  The Khalil Gibran School is a prime example of this “smear” campaign where the 
madrassa label was used to delegitimize the enterprise.  Of course, to a person for whom the term 
has no particular meanings, the label would be utterly senseless—there is nothing offensive about 
calling a school a school after all.  See supra note 59 and accompanying text. 
 206.  For a sample of these websites, see, e.g., DANIEL PIPES: MIDDLE EASTER FORUM, 
http://www.danielpipes.org (last visited Jan. 19, 2013); ISLAM-WATCH.ORG, http://www.islam-
watch.org (last visited Jan. 19, 2013); JIHADWATCH.ORG, http://www.jihadwatch.org (last visited 
Jan. 19, 2013).  
 207.  The appropriation of this term suggests that “dhimmitude” was an ongoing burden on 
non-Muslims erasing a complicated history of minority status within existing empires.  While it 
cannot be denied that non-Muslim minorities were treated differently by the state, it is equally true 
that different ethnicities were treated differently by dominant ruling powers like the Ottomans.  
Moreover, after the introduction of capitulations, some minorities were given even greater 
protection than that of the “native;” they could essentially place themselves under the protection of 
external states like the French and the British.  Further, it is important to point out the double 
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the newly minted neologism dhimmitude now negatively denotes the 
status of dhimmi not as a protected class but as a subordinated class 
within a modern state.208  An Islamic state, according to this thinking, is 
incapable of treating all groups equally because it requires non-Muslims 
to assume a second-class status.209 
The term taqqiyya, which had been uncommon, is increasing in 
popularity.  Taqqiyya is a practice that allowed Shi’a Muslims to 
dissemble about their religious affiliation when under attack for being 
Shi’a and persecuted by Sunnis.  It has been reinvested with the meaning 
that Muslims may lie at will to deceive non-Muslims.  Thus, the 
redefined practice is now cited to support the belief that nothing a 
Muslim says can be taken at face value or as truth.  The religion requires 
pathological mendacity.  The result is that no defense or assertion of a 
Muslim’s good faith is believable because by definition, Islam requires 
Muslims to lie to non-Muslims.210  This redefinition is perhaps the most 
pernicious and racist because it captures Muslim in a loop—no amount 
of explaining, disavowing of the “wrong” beliefs or professing of the 
“right” ones is satisfactory because the Muslim is a liar and, therefore, 
anything she says is immediately dismissed as an attempt to hoodwink 
the unsuspecting. 
The Tennessee law as it was originally proposed provides perhaps 
the most overt and startling example of the power to resignify Islam in a 
way that suits the dominant anti-Muslim discourse.  In this document, 
shari’ah is redefined to mean a militaristic ideology and religion that 
supports violence to achieve an Islamic state.211  This particular 
redefinition is most alarming because it makes two seemingly 
 
standard often employed by those using the term “dhimmitude.”  While they charge Muslim 
empires, which were monarchic and made no claims to Liberal ideas of rights, with treating their 
minorities as second class citizens, they seem to overlook European empires that were willing to kill 
their subjects—let alone citizens, second class or otherwise—en masse as readily as the Ottomans. 
As for the modern period, it is arguable that most states with homogenous populations treat their 
minorities as second-class citizens, the United States’ history in this regard is nothing of which to be 
proud.  See AARON KLEIN, SCHMOOZING WITH TERRORISTS: FROM HOLLYWOOD TO THE HOLY 
LAND, JIHADISTS REVEAL THEIR GLOBAL PLANS—TO A JEW! 9-10 (2007). 
 208.  See generally BAT YE’OR, THE DHIMMI: JEWS AND CHRISTIANS UNDER ISLAM (1985); 
Abdullahi A. An-Na’im, Religious Minorities under Islamic Law and the Limits of Cultural 
Relativism, 9 HUM. RTS. Q. 1, 1-18 (1987).  But cf. Nasim, The concept of Al-Dhimmah and the 
rights and duties of Dhimmis in an Islamic state, 9 J. INSTITUTE OF MUSLIM MINORITY AFFAIRS 2, 
217-222 (1988). 
 209.  See KLEIN supra note 207, at 19. 
 210.  See Boura, Islamic Tactics of Taqqiya teaches Muslims to practice Deception, Fraud & 
Double Standards to Spread Islam, DANIELPIPES: MIDDLE EAST FORUM (Nov. 9, 2006, 22:11), 
http://www.danielpipes.org/comments/65699. 
 211.  See supra note 61 (describing the original Tennessee law). 
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conflicting moves: first it reduces Islam to a political ideology akin to 
communism.  The adherents of the religion become analogous to 
political ideologues who must be convinced of the error of their 
pernicious beliefs.  Islam’s relevance as a religion is diminished.  
Second, it totalizes that construction to create a group of adherents 
whose every action can be explained via their Muslim identity.  Islam as 
a politics drives all.  To put it another way, Islam as a religion that does 
not dictate all political commitments but rather, like all religions, 
competes with other important markers of identity such as gender, 
sexual orientation, ethnicity, linguistic affiliations, and geography in a 
dynamic and complex way is radically oversimplified and totalized.  As 
such, the law cannot be seen as merely an anti-syndicalism measure and 
dismissed as having no real effect on “good” Muslims.  There is far 
more going on here than the equation of Islam to communism and as I 
argue below, it is questionable whether there is any possibility in reality 
of a “good Muslim.” 
2. Creating an Identity: Muslim Propensities 
Having captured the vocabulary of Islam and resignified it, these 
anti-shari’ah laws also reflect a particular opinion of Muslims.  What are 
the traits of a Muslim who chooses to, as Pennsylvania Representative 
Swanger puts it, “embrace Shariah law, which is inherently hostile to our 
constitutional liberties?”212  This view makes these choices mutually 
exclusive.213  If shari’ah has been defined as inherently hostile to the 
liberties guaranteed in the Constitution, anyone who continues to follow 
the former must then be a threat to our political and legal order.  This 
construction of identity in which religious Muslims inevitably choose 
religion as their politics may result in a particular kind of subject, but 
that subject is further fleshed out by adding premodern attributes.  The 
result is that Muslims are demarcated as essentially different from “real” 
Americans. 
Muslims have long been the objects of stereotyping like other 
groups.  A large literature already exists of colonial constructions of 
race.214  Here, I want to simply add that in the War on Terror, which 
 
 212.  See supra note 86. 
 213.  Note that because of the resignification of taqqiyya, no amount of repudiation of violence 
or support for jihadism, or rejection of political Islam serves to quiet the anxiety of the 
Islamophobe.  All such attempts are reinterpreted as lies told to non-Muslims because of taqqiyya!  
The circular reasoning results in the view of all Muslims as pathological liars who then by definition 
cannot signify themselves. 
 214.  See, e.g., SAID, ORIENTALISM AND SAID, CULTURE AND IMPERIALISM, supra note 193; 
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includes our domestic national security measures, “Muslim” as an 
identity prescribed by the dominant discourse has taken on the attributes 
of a number of other groups that came before.  But it is also unique in 
that it already had a negative history to which more could be added.  For 
instance, Muslims are not the first group to be considered a threat to 
national security, and they are certainly not the only group against whom 
the law has been used as a weapon.215  As numerous scholars have 
pointed out, Japanese Americans and German Americans have also been 
stigmatized when the United States has been at war.  Certainly, the 
renewed calls for loyalty oaths and even internment simply rely on 
previous actions taken to secure the homeland.216  But the character of 
Muslims as violent, terroristic, and hateful of “our way of life,” 
oppressive to women, lascivious and venal, mendacious, and incapable 
of entering modernity (read leaving a medieval religious sensibility 
behind) makes them quite unique.217  Few modern stereotypes have 
antecedents in the Crusades.218  The more current attributes of 
Muslimness are cobbled together from readily available stereotypes of 
 
Ian F. Haney-Lopez, The Social Contruction of Race: Some Observations on Illusion, Fabrication, 
and Choice, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1 (1994); Audrey Smedley & Brian D. Smedley, Race as 
Biology Is Fiction, Racism as a Social Problem Is Real: Anthropological and Historical 
Perspectives on the Social Construction of Race, 60 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 16 (Jan. 2005). 
 215.  See Aya Gruber, Raising the Red Flag: The Continued Relevance of Japanese Internment 
in the Post-Hamdi World, 54 U. KAN  L. REV. 307 (2006); Natsu Saito Taylor, Internments, Then & 
Now: Constitutional Accountability in Post-9/11 America, 2 DUKE F.L. & SOC. CHANGE 71 (2010). 
 216.  Id. 
 217.  JACK G. SHAHEEN, REEL BAD ARABS: HOW HOLLYWOOD VILIFIES A PEOPLE 12-14 
(2001); Susan M. Akram & Kevin R. Johnson, Migration Regulation Goes Local: The Role of 
States in U.S. Immigration Policy: Race, Civil Rights, and Immigration Law After September 11, 
2001: The Targeting of Arabs and Muslims, 58 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 295, 304 (2002); see 
Jeremy Clutchy, Imus anchor on Palestinians: “Stinking animals. They ought to drop the bomb 
right there, kill ‘em all right now” MEDIA MATTERS FOR AM. (Nov. 19, 2004, 6:22 PM EST), 
http://mediamatters.org/items/200411190009. 
MSNBC’s Imus in the Morning offered derisive, racist commentary about Palestinians 
during the November 12 funeral of deceased Palestinian Authority leader Yasser Arafat.  
Regular Imus guest and sports anchor Sid Rosenberg referred to Palestinians as “stinking 
animals” and suggested: “[t]hey ought to drop the bomb right there, kill ‘em all right 
now.”  
On November 19, the program broadcast a radio segment featuring a guest—parodying 
General George S. Patton, Jr.—who said that the recent report of a U.S. Marine shooting 
an unarmed, injured Iraqi insurgent provided the enemy “with another cozy ‘al Jazeera 
moment’ for the Muslim masses to respond to with their routine pack-of rabid-sheep 
mentality.”  The guest also referred to a deceased Iraqi insurgent as “a booby-trapped 
raghead cadaver.” 
 218.  See, e.g., SAID, CULTURE AND IMPERIALISM, supra note 193.  For a history of the 
Crusades from the Arab and Middle Eastern perspective, see generally AMIN MALOUF, CRUSADES 
THROUGH ARAB EYES (1989). 
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Muslim males in particular from various locations: the Saudi patriarch, 
the Palestinian terrorists, the Pakistani double-dealer, the Afghan zealot, 
and the Egyptian or Iraqi Muslim-supremacist intent on sectarian 
violence.219  When put together, the proverbial nightmare monster of 
“normal” people’s dreams is realized—a thing inhumane and sub-
human.  Muslim women are reduced to the trope of the sexually 
oppressed, burka-wearing silent ghosts constantly threatened with honor 
killing and too oppressed to even speak.220  The Muslim is a person 
steeped in culture and religion.  As such, all actions they undertake are 
driven by this premodern sensibility.221 
A clear example of this sort of stereotyping can be seen in a recent 
op-ed by Richard Cohen of the Washington Post.222  The column was 
 
 219.  See supra note 216 and accompanying text. 
 220.  See generally Scott supra note 191; see also WENDY BROWN, REGULATING AVERSION: 
TOLERANCE IN THE AGE OF IDENTITY AND EMPIRE 60-66 (2008). 
 221.  Id.  In the media, when a Muslim commits an act of violence, the deterministic script 
deployed tells us that he or she was driven by Islam.  Moving to Islam and the conflation of religion 
and politics (obscuring politics) results in the obscuring of the primarily political bases for Muslim 
violence and also obscures U.S. violence against Muslims abroad.  Take for instance, the treatment 
of Virginia Tech shooter, Cho Seung-hui, as compared to Army psychologist, Nidal Hasan.  In the 
case of the former, his mental health was the determining factor for his actions.  His Koreanness or 
ethnicity was not a motivating factor.  On the other hand, Major Hasan’s actions were construed as 
being driven by his Palestinian origins and his Muslim identity while his mental health is treated far 
less seriously as a motivator for his actions.  Muslims are not even capable of “madness” or mental 
disease unless it has something to do with religion.  I use this example to underscore that a variety 
of factors are at play in any violent incident.  In the case of Muslim perpetrators, it is Islam that is 
given the most weight while other perhaps more salient variables are downplayed.  See also Daniel 
Engber, Is There a Lot of Crime on Military Bases? Not as much as you’d think, SLATE (Nov. 5, 
2009, 8:28 PM ET), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/explainer/2009/11/
is_there_a_lot_of_crime_on_military_bases.html; Arment Keteyian, U.S. Army Base Has Bloody 
History, CBS EVENING NEWS WITH SCOTT PELLEY (Nov. 5, 2009, 5:15 PM), 
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2009/11/05/eveningnews/main5541051.shtml?tag=contentMain;co
ntentBod; see also Lauren Cox, Fort Hood Motive Terrorism or Mental Illness?, ABC NEWS (Nov. 
9, 2009) http://abcnews.go.com/Health/MindMoodNews/fort-hood-shooters-intentions-mass-
murder-terrorism/story?id=9019410#.Tu9thdWwVT8. 
 222.  See Richard Cohen, Post Opinions: Enough of Rick Santorum’s sermons, WASH. POST 
(Feb. 27, 2012), http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/enough-of-rick-santorums-sermons/2012
/02/27/gIQAvUKieR_story.html. 
The tendency to focus on the religious or cultural explanation is also evident in the reporting of an 
attack thwarted by law enforcement in July 2011.  In those attacks, Yonathan Melaku was 
apprehended outside the Pentagon with bomb-making materials in his backpack and evidence that 
he wanted to engage in violent jihad.  The Washington Post reports that “[l]aw enforcement sources 
said that it was unclear what religion Melaku follows and that they were investigating that aspect of 
his life; leaders at the mosques near his home said they did not know Melaku or his family.”  
Looking for a motive in religion and interviewing mosque leaders reinscribes the well-worn script 
that religion motivates these attacks.  Searching for religious identity then becomes important.  
Moreover, self-profession without any knowledge of Islam is enough to create the causal link.  In 
other words, Melaku can shout “Allahu Akbar” and profess to be a Muslim without knowing 
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not about Muslims at all but about Rick Santorum, a contender for the 
Republican nomination.223  Commenting on the controversy raised by 
Santorum’s claim that the separation of church and state makes him sick 
and his belief that there should not be an impermeable barrier between 
the two, Cohen starts with the following: 
Mullah Rick has spoken. 
He wants religion returned to “the public square,” is opposed to 
contraception, premarital sex and abortion under any circumstances, 
wants children educated in what amounts to little red schoolhouses and 
called President Obama a “snob” for extolling college or some other 
kind of post-high school education.  This is not a political platform.  
It’s a fatwa.224 
He goes on to discuss Santorum’s various problems with secularism and 
higher education, women’s rights and the prevalence of religion in the 
public square.  He ends with this: 
But when I mull Santorum’s views on contraception, the role of 
women, the proper place for religion and what he thinks about 
education, I think he’s either running for president of the wrong 
country or marooned in the wrong century.  The man is lost.225 
Whatever one’s opinion of Rick Santorum, the link between his views 
and Islam is deftly made in the first line.  The stereotype at work here is 
that Muslim clergy are regressive and hold political positions that 
support the oppression of women and that are anti-modern.  Moreover, 
misusing (and resignifying) the term “fatwa,” Cohen asserts that Rick 
Santorum has issued one by calling Obama a snob.  And, in case the 
reader had forgotten that Santorum’s views are more in line with a 
backward Muslim clergy, he ends with the allusion that Santorum 
 
anything about Islam and having no ties to Muslims and yet Islam is purportedly the motivator for 
his actions.  See Josh White & Allison Klein, Pentagon shooting suspect not known to officials, 
WASH. POST, June 23, 2011, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/local/pentagon-shooting-
suspect-not-known-to-law-enforcement/2011/06/23/AGniB8hH_story.html (emphasis added).   
A Google search of the string “Yonathan Melaku Muslim” results in a plethora of websites many of 
which demand to know why the news agencies failed to report that Melaku was a Muslim.  Others 
point out that there is no evidence that he is a Muslim, while others simply assume that he is.  See 
GOOGLE, 
http://www.google.com/search?client=safari&rls=en&q=yonathan+melaku+Muslim&ie=UTF-
8&oe=UTF-8 (last visited, Jan. 19, 2013).  It should be noted that anyone can convert to Islam with 
relative ease.  This makes it difficult to disavow them as a Muslim despite the fact that they may not 
be part of a larger community of Muslims. 
 223.  See Cohen, supra note 222. 
 224.  Id. 
 225.  Id. 
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rightfully belongs in another country (read Iran).  Suffice it to say that 
the position of Muslim clergy on any subject is multifarious; after all, 
there is no central religious authority akin to the Pope who speaks for 
them all.  Yet, the less obvious stereotype at work here is the clearly 
erroneous vision that white, educated, heterosexual men cannot have 
these kinds of views without it being some sort of (Islamic-tainted) 
aberration.  It’s normal for Muslims, but abnormal for Santorum and his 
ilk.  There are no descriptors aside from Islamic one’s like “mullah” and 
“fatwa” to describe him.  In other words, even when homegrown 
religious fundamentalists hold premodern positions that liberals disagree 
with, the terms used to describe them are ones that reify the stereotypes 
about Muslims.  We talk about them as though they were part of an alien 
population rather than entirely American examples of religious 
fundamentalism. 
A more startling example of the stereotype substituting for real 
analysis comes from the shootings and bombing in Norway in 2011.  
Anders Breivik, a self-defined nationalist, perpetrated the worst terrorist 
attack on Norway to date driven by the kind of ideology that members of 
SANE and PPA disseminate.226  His manifesto quotes liberally from 
groups directly related to the anti-shari’ah measures.227  Yet in the early 
hours of the incident, the blame was squarely placed on Muslims, 
reinforcing the view that only Muslims do this kind of violence.228  The 
incident was reminiscent of the U.S.’s experience with the Oklahoma 
bombing.  Such rushes to judgment have serious consequences for both 
Muslims and our national security.  As others have argued before, this 
blinkered view of the “enemy” prevents us from seeing the threat posed 
by a variety of quarters.229 
This move to conflate Islam and politics allows for a flexible 
strategy where Islam as politics is something that can be shed by 
Muslims; they can choose to become “capitalists” or proponents of 
democracy.  At the same time, it is also inescapable because it is a 
 
 226.  Chris Rodda, Writers Cited in Breivik Manifesto Have Spoken at U.S. Military Colleges 
as Anti-Terrorism Experts, HUFFINGTON POST (July 28, 2011, 12:00 PM ET), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/chris-rodda/writers-cited-in-breivik-_b_910407.html; see also 
Robert Mendick, Norway Massacre: the real Anders Behring Breivik, THE TELEGRAPH, July 31, 
2011 available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/11/us/politics/11king.html; Anders Breivik, 
2083: A European Declaration of Independence (2011), available at http://unitednations.ispnw.org/
archives/breivik-manifesto-2011.pdf.  
 227.  Breivik, supra note 226. 
 228.  Raja Abdulrahim, Muslims feel initial sting of blame, L.A. TIMES, July 23, 2011, 
available at http://articles.latimes.com/2011/jul/23/world/la-fg-norway-blame-20110724. 
 229.  Deborah A. Ramirez, Jennifer Hoopes, & Tara Lai Quinlan, Defining Racial Profiling in 
a Post-September 11 World, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1195 (2003).  
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religion and therefore integral to identity; it is part of the essence of 
Muslims.  The conflation allows the anti-shari’ah proponents to both 
charge Muslims with choosing to follow Islam and to construct them as 
inevitably driven by religion that cannot be shed.  The Muslim is a 
subject that is both political, choosing to follow the ideology of Islam 
and religious, unable to choose but infused with religious or cultural 
sensibility.  The subject can only escape the ideology through 
conversion (see Chart 1 below).  This opens up a number of avenues for 
regulation based on politics and religion both locally and globally. 230 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 230.  It should be made clear that, while I critique those in the United States who reduce 
Muslims to their religious identity, I do recognize some Muslims’ invocation of Islam even when 
acting for non-religious, political reasons has complicated matters.  The history of the use of Islam 
as a political vernacular is beyond the scope of this paper. However, it is worth noting that a more 
nuanced analysis of motivations is needed to go beyond the shallow view that Islam, as a religion, is 
the driving force for all violence.  In other words, the view that “they did it because of their 
religion” is facile, reductionist and explains very little.   
UNITED STATES 
 
Good Muslims/U.S. 
Patriots/Reject Shari’ah/Leave 
Islam/Criticize Islam 
U.S. Muslims following Shari’ah 
[Assumption: shari’ah/Islam 
results in particular political 
beliefs] 
 
PERIPHERY 
 
Terrorists/ Adhere to 
Shari’ah/Defend Islam/Criticize 
U.S. 
To be accepted as a  
“real” American, 
Muslims  
must reject adherence to  
shari’ah 
Refusal to disavow 
shari’ah results in  
categorization as 
Other/Un-American 
Chart 1: Categorizing Muslims in the United States 
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3. Applying the Rule of (Which) Law?: National Security v. Civil 
and Human Rights 
I have argued above that redefining Islam and Islamic terms so that 
they can no longer be used in their ordinary sense and the construction 
of a capacious Muslim stereotype (carried forward from history and 
added to in the present) are two strategies that work to create a 
comprehensible, identifiable enemy.  In this section, I want to briefly 
touch upon the way in which law itself can play into this creation.  The 
application of a particular set of laws primarily to Muslims is both a 
cause and an effect of the construction of the enemy.  Insofar as the 
global War on Terror and national security are primarily constructed 
around the problem of Islamist terrorism after 9/11, Muslims are their 
object.  The laws are both an effect of a real set of circumstances (terror 
attacks) and a cause in that they constantly create the subject of a 
Muslim identity repetitively linked to terror.  Furthermore, the national 
security discourse subsumes human rights and civil rights under the 
superior claim of security.  That is precisely why calls for the respect of 
Muslim citizens’ civil rights are largely unpersuasive in the social 
arena—the discourse creates a constant threat which must be answered 
by regulating Muslims.231  It is easy to sacrifice the civil rights of a 
small, disfavored minority and to subject them to differential legal 
treatment for the purported security of the greater population.232 
For instance, the proponents of anti-shari’ah laws seek to exclude 
Muslim citizens from “normal” law because these Muslims who follow 
shari’ah have no commitment to that law.  That is to say, they eschew 
the Constitution and American civic values.233  Indeed, by clinging to a 
hostile religio-political law, an ideology rather than a faith, they remove 
themselves from the protections of civil rights.234  Thus, the promise of 
 
 231.  SHADI MOKHTARI, AFTER ABU GHRAIB: EXPLORING HUMAN RIGHTS IN AMERICA AND 
THE MIDDLE EAST 105 (Chris Arup, et al. eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 2009). 
 232.  See Gruber supra note 215 (discussing Japanese internment). 
 233.  See Globalizing the Margins, supra note 192. 
 234.  See MAHMOOD MAMDANI, GOOD MUSLIM, BAD MUSLIM: AMERICA, THE COLD WAR 
AND THE ROOTS OF TERROR 18-23 (2004).  Mamdani explores the lack of politics as an explanation 
of their actions or beliefs: 
In the post-9/11 America, Culture Talk focuses on Islam and Muslim who presumably 
made culture only at the beginning of creation, as some extraordinary, prophetic act.  
After that, it seems Muslims just conformed to culture.  According to some, our culture 
seems to have no history, no politics, and no debates, so that all Muslims are just plain 
bad.  According to others, there is a history a politics, even debates, and there are good 
Muslims and bad Muslims.  In both versions, history seems to have petrified into a 
lifeless custom of an antique people who inhabit antique lands.  Or could it be that 
culture here stands for habit, for some kind of instinctive activity with rules that are 
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equality before the law (where laws that apply are fairly administered) 
does not translate into the equality of laws that apply to Muslims.  The 
threat that they pose using the liberal laws of the land to infiltrate and 
subvert secular order require particular responses.  Anti-shari’ah laws 
then can be read as a means of foreclosing the access to legal techniques 
like those of comity and conflicts of law in our system that are means by 
which inherently destructive laws like shari’ah infiltrate. 
While these laws do little to protect the homeland because they are 
aimed at an imaginary threat (shari’ah creep), they do have a 
commonality with national security laws insofar as they single out 
Muslims for special treatment.  They continually remind us that we can 
never let down our guard or vigilance.  It is beyond the scope of this 
paper to examine all the specialized laws that apply in depth, but a brief 
recounting of some of these regulations is warranted here to make the 
case that there is a concerted effort at discriminating against Muslims 
underway. 
Before the War on Terror, racial profiling had become a disfavored 
approach to policing.235  The use of race as a proxy for criminality was 
rejected for both its racism and its inefficacy.236  However, after 9/11, 
erstwhile critics of the practice changed their positions to call for the 
profiling of Muslim/Arab-looking people to prevent another attack.237  
The result has been a net failure.  Few prosecutions were undertaken 
after the 9/11 sweeps in which most people who were captured were 
violators of immigration laws, not terrorists.  Further, people who are not 
Muslim have been captured because they are visibly different from 
“real” Americans.  In the meanwhile, the races of people that have been 
captured and prosecuted for terrorism include White, Latino, Black, 
South Asian, and Arab, giving the lie to any belief that terrorists can be 
visibly identified.  By that logic, a terrorist seems to look like anyone 
caught doing terrorist acts! 
 Along with profiling has come heightened surveillance, including 
surveillance without warrants and probable cause.238  Periodic 
 
inscribed in early founding texts, usually religious, and mummified in early artifacts? 
Id. at 18. 
 235.  See DAVID COLE, NO EQUAL JUSTICE: RACE AND CLASS IN THE AMERICAN CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE SYSTEM 34-41 (1999); See Ramirez, supra note 229. 
 236.  Cole, supra note 235; Ramirez, supra note 229. 
 237.  See Richard R. Banks, Racial Profiling and Antiterrorism Efforts, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 
1201 (2003). 
 238.  The latest of the surveillance “scandals” is the revelation of a widespread surveillance of 
Muslim students extending out of state conducted by the NYPD.  See Ryan Devereaux, Muslim 
student monitored by the NYPD: ‘It just brings everything home’, THE GUARDIAN (Feb. 22, 2012, 
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revelations of eavesdropping, wiretapping, infiltration of groups, and 
spying demonstrate the ongoing scrutiny of a minority population 
regardless of their actual acts or affiliations.239 Indeed, recent 
investigations show that police agencies made note of how many times 
surveilled Muslims prayed and their level of observance of the faith, 
conflating practice of the religion with suspicious activity.240  This sort 
of begging the question is unsurprising given that there have been 
several exposes of law enforcement using Islamophobic materials for 
training purposes.241  Another form of surveillance are the hearings on 
Muslim radicalism held by Representative Peter King on March 10, 
2011.242  Ostensibly, the hearings were to determine the level of 
radicalism taking place within the United States as a means of assessing 
the threat from homegrown terrorism.  What is interesting about these 
hearings, coming ten years after 9/11, is the choice of representatives of 
the Muslim community.  In what has become an easily identified, shop-
worn tactic, the hearings used “native informants” who corroborated the 
prejudices of King and his supporters.  Those informants hardly 
represent the diverse and multiethnic and multiracial Muslim community 
in the United States and provided no data backing the claim that 
 
13.02 EST), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/feb/22/nypd-surveillance-muslim-student-
groups. 
Rasul was named in a police report compiled on April 21, 2008.  He was one of 18 
Muslim students who traveled to upstate New York that day for a whitewater-rafting 
trip.  Among the group was an undercover officer who monitored the outing, noting 
topics of conversation and counting the amount of times they prayed. 
“In addition to the regularly scheduled events (rafting), the group prayed at least four 
times a day, and much of the conversation was spent discussing Islam and was religious 
in nature,” the report noted.  Since it was issued there has been no indication the NYPD 
brought terrorism-related charges against any of the students. (emphasis added). 
For other instances of surveillance, see Local Muslims outraged by alleged FBI surveillance, 
lawyers claim, LA NOW, LA TIMES (Feb 23, 2011, 1:13 PM), http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/
lanow/2011/02/local-muslims-outrage-by-alleged-fbi-surveillance-lawyers-claim.html; Peter Yost 
FBI defends surveillance guidelines allegedly targeting Muslims, ARAB NEWS (July 28, 2010), 
http://www.arabnews.com/node/351363; Amanda Remling, NJ Muslim Officials Meet in Newark: 
Investigation of 2007 NYPD Surveillance, INT’L BUS. TIMES (Mar. 3 2012, 5:59 PM), 
http://www.ibtimes.com/articles/308563/20120303/muslim-leaders-new-jersey-nypd-surveillance-
meeting.htm. 
 239.  Devereaux, supra note 238. 
 240.  Id. 
 241.  Id.  See Michael Powell, In Police Training, a Dark Film on U.S. Muslims, N.Y. TIMES, 
Jan. 24, 2012, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/24/nyregion/in-police-training-
a-dark-film-on-us-muslims.html?pagewanted=all. 
 242.  See The Extent of Radicalization in the American Muslim Community and that 
Community’s Response: Hearing before the Comm. On Homeland Sec., 112th Cong. 1-73 (2011), 
available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-112hhrg72541/pdf/CHRG-112hhrg72541.pdf. 
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Muslims in the United States were being radicalized at high rates.243  
Rather members of law enforcement suggested that this was not the case.  
In sum, the hearings presented a stark lack of evidence of the conclusion 
that we have a problem with Muslim radicalism.244  Nevertheless, the 
hearings once again reinforced the Muslim-terror connection in the 
popular imagination.245 
Terrorism laws, such as the PATRIOT Act, subject Muslims to 
regulation and capture for vague crimes such as material support for 
terrorist groups.246  “Material support” provisions of national security 
laws are ambiguous and open to a range of interpretations.247  The 
 
 243.  The hearings had no recognizable representatives of major Muslim communities like 
those in New York; Dearborn, Michigan; or Los Angeles.  Rather, the committee chose to hear 
testimony from those who have virtually no standing as leaders of any community but who have 
since the hearings capitalized on their moment in the spotlight.  For an academic approach to 
radicalization in Muslim communities, see David Schanzer, Charles Kurzman & Ebrahim Moosa, 
Anti-Terror Lessons of Muslim-Americans (Jan. 6, 2010), available at http://www.sanford.duke.edu/
news/Schanzer_Kurzman_Moosa_Anti-Terror_Lessons.pdf (finding that radicalism has gone down 
in the Muslim community).  Compare this with Southern Poverty Law Center’s recent report on the 
increase in Patriot groups and militia’s, Mark Potok, The Patriot movement explodes, INTELLIGENCE 
REP., Spring 2012, available at http://www.splcenter.org/get-informed/intelligence-report/browse-
all-issues/2012/spring/the-year-in-hate-and-extremism.  It is interesting to note that the study has 
been challenged on grounds that it does not adequately reflect the actual radicalization of Muslims, 
however, it is important to query whether any report absolving Muslims of terroristic tendencies 
would satisfy those who have already made prejudgments about the communities precisely because 
such a report does not support their view?   
 244.  See The Extent of Radicalization in the American Muslim Community and that 
Community’s Response: Hearing before the Comm. On Homeland Sec., 112th Cong. 71-120 (2011) 
(Statement of Sheriff Leroy Baca, Los Angeles County Sheriff Department), available at 
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-112hhrg72541/pdf/CHRG-112hhrg72541.pdf. 
 245.  For instance, the very title of some media reports leave one in no doubt of the Manichean 
tendencies of “good and evil” that are deployed against Muslims, see, e.g., Gail Russell Chaddock, 
Peter King hearings: Are American Muslims the problem or the solution?, CHRISTIAN SCI. 
MONITOR, Mar. 10, 2011, available at http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Politics/2011/0310/Peter-
King-hearings-Are-American-Muslims-the-problem-or-the-solution.  Note that the story is followed 
by a list of the top ten American jihadis.   
 246.  For academic treatments of the liberty for security trade off, see generally Natsu Taylor 
Saito, Beyond the Citizen/Alien Dichotomy: Liberty, Security, and the Exercise of Plenary Power, 
14 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 389 (2005); David Cole, The New McCarthyism: Repeating 
History in the War on Terrorism, 38 HARV. CIV. RTS & CIV. LIBERTIES L. REV. 1, 1-30 (2003); 
Natsu Taylor Saito, Whose Liberty? Whose Security? The USA Patriot Act in the Context of 
Cointelpro and the Unlawful Repression of Political Dissent, 81 OR. L. REV. 1051 (2002). 
 247.  18 U.S.C §2339B (a)(1) (West 2013): 
Unlawful conduct—Whoever knowingly provides material support or resources to a 
foreign terrorist organization, or attempts or conspires to do so, shall be fined under this 
title or imprisoned not more than 15 years, or both, and, if the death of any person 
results, shall be imprisoned for any term of years or for life. To violate this paragraph, a 
person must have knowledge that the organization is a designated terrorist organization 
(as defined in subsection (g)(6)), that the organization has engaged or engages in terrorist 
activity (as defined in section 212(a)(3)(B) of the Immigration and Nationality Act), or 
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definition is given in the United States code as: 
the term “material support or resources” means any property, tangible 
or intangible, or service, including currency or monetary instruments 
or financial securities, financial services, lodging, training, expert 
advice or assistance, safehouses, false documentation or identification, 
communications equipment, facilities, weapons, lethal substances, 
explosives, personnel (1 or more individuals who may be or include 
oneself), and transportation, except medicine or religious materials; 
the term “training” means instruction or teaching designed to impart a 
specific skill, as opposed to general knowledge; and 
the term “expert advice or assistance” means advice or assistance 
derived from scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge.248 
As is readily discernible, the definition is open to interpretation and 
captures any number of activities.  Would knowingly selling food or 
gasoline to members of the Sinn Fein—once regarded as terrorists by the 
United Kingdom and freedom fighters by the Irish—result in a violation 
of the law?  To answer this question requires the ordinary person to 
know whether that organization is on a list of terrorist organizations and 
whether this activity constitutes material support.  The list of terrorist 
organizations is maintained by the Department of State and it is not 
comprehensive; therefore, it is possible that a charitable donation 
overseas may lead to prosecution for material support here249 for terrorist 
organizations includes non-fungible support like expert advice even for 
non-violent or humanitarian reasons.250  As a result, the possibility of 
lengthy detention or even internment is an ever-present concern. 
The increased preoccupation with “homegrown” terrorists ten years 
after the attacks has renewed the need for hyper-vigilance on the part of 
“real” Americans.  After 9/11, the round up and detention of Muslim 
men and their ongoing detention amounted to de facto internment.251  
 
that the organization has engaged or engages in terrorism (as defined in section 140(d)(2) 
of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989). 
 248.  18 U.S.C. §2339A(b)(1) (West 2013). 
 249.  Kavitha Rajagopalan, Charitable donation or material support for terrorism?, PBS (Aug. 
18, 2010, 6:03 PM), http://www.pbs.org/wnet/need-to-know/opinion/charitable-donation-or-
material-support-for-terrorism/2905/. 
 250.  18 U.S.C. § 2339A(b)(1) (2009); Larry Abramson & Maria Godoy, The Patriot Act: Key 
Controversies, NPR (Feb. 14, 2006), http://www.npr.org/news/specials/patriotact/
patriotactprovisions.html; Ariane de Vogue, Speech or Support for Terrorists? Supreme Court 
Weighs Patriot Act Provision, ABC NEWS (Feb. 22, 2010), http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/supreme-
court-weigh-free-speech-material-support-law-first-amendment-rights/story?id=9891625. 
 251.  See Cyra Akila Choudhury, Terrorists & Muslims: The Construction, Performance, and 
Regulation of Muslim Identities in the Post-9/11 United States, 7 RUTGERS J. L. & RELIGION 8 
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Moreover, Muslims continue to be the objects of suspicion and the 
subjects of regulation and surveillance.  The extraordinary treatment via 
specialized national security laws, use of military commissions, and 
attempts at denying habeas corpus erode protections afforded other 
groups and make Muslims second-class citizens vulnerable to 
expulsion.252 
The inferiority of their status is revealed by the effects of the 
specialized laws the general populace is willing to tolerate and, in fact, 
demands.  The ease with which they are placed in indefinite detention, 
tortured, and killed unlike other “real” citizens indicates how far the 
marginalization of the constructed enemy has gone.  The inability of 
civil rights or human rights to trump or even restrain the security 
apparatus’s abuse of Muslims goes to show that Muslims have a difficult 
time convincing others of their very humanity.  As we might be 
reminded, the Constitution is not a suicide pact; the liberties it provides 
should not become vulnerabilities.  Consequently, the law justifies the 
regulation of the enemy it has a hand in constructing, and it is not 
surprising to find that the anti-shari’ah measures have been defended in 
national security terms and as national security measures.  In fact, this 
linkage also performs the role of linking domestic Muslims as potential 
traitors to their global (terroristic) counterparts and legitimates their 
regulation through global anti-terror measures.253 
In the global sphere, certain Muslims are expelled from the 
protection of civilian laws, human rights, and international laws through 
the legitimation of anti-terrorism laws exported by the United States and 
the initial suspension of the Geneva Convention.254  Both human rights 
and the laws of war protect humans from mistreatment in a time of war.  
The withdrawal of such protection, then, can be seen as legally creating 
a space in which politics prevails over law and where Muslims can be 
treated with impunity.  Unfortunately, in the Bush-era, that space could 
conceivably be anywhere Muslims are to be found.  Indeed, as the 9/11 
Commission stated in its report, the boundaries between states have 
collapsed: “In this sense, 9/11 has taught us that terrorism against 
American interests ‘over there’ should be regarded just as we regard 
terrorism against America ‘over here.’  In this same sense, the American 
 
(2006) [hereinafter “Terrorists & Muslims”].   
 252.  Id. 
 253.  B.E. Whitaker, Exporting the Patriot Act? democracy and the “war on terror” in the 
Third World, 28 THIRD WORLD Q. 1017-1032 (2007). 
 254.  Id. 
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homeland is the planet.”255  Such a sentiment reflects the Bush 
administration’s will to do whatever it takes, including refusing recourse 
to international law to Muslims in order to prosecute its war on terror 
globally. 
More recently, in his support of the National Defense Authorization 
Act of 2012, Senator Lindsey Graham argued that the military should be 
able to detain American citizens in the U.S. indefinitely because 
America is “part of the battlefield” and that these alleged traitors should 
not be afforded any due process.256  Reflecting a dialectical relationship 
between the local and the global—if not the collapse of the boundary 
between the two—it is evident that what happens in the periphery has an 
impact on what happens in the core and vice versa.  National security 
laws gone global regulate Muslims both “over here” and “over there.”  
Civil or human rights are marginal, if not obstructions, to the goals of 
counterterrorism and must be suspended of necessity.  Those who are the 
proper subjects of national security then come under the jurisdiction of 
specialized laws like those described above and the anti-shari’ah laws 
that seek to become a part of that body of law; the civil and human rights 
guarantees that have often been touted as universal and applicable to all 
show their limits. 
B. Effects: Expulsion, Detention and Death 
Anti-shari’ah laws currently being proposed or passed in the state 
legislatures are examples of an overall strategy to define and 
circumscribe the boundaries of belonging in the United States.257  The 
 
 255.  See 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT supra note 194, at 517 (emphasis added). 
 256.  Video: Floor Speech: Graham Supports the National Defense Authorization Act, 
LINDSEYGRAHAM.COM (Dec. 15, 2011), http://www.lindseygraham.com/2011/12/video-floor-
speech-graham-supports-the-national-defense-authorization-act/.  The floor debate about the Udall 
Amendment to the NDAA which would have excised the ability to detain American citizens was 
rejected by many senators, including Graham.  See also CONG. REC. S8012-8054 (daily ed. Nov. 30, 
2011), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CREC-2011-11-30/html/CREC-2011-11-30-pt1-
PgS8012-2.htm; Ceding Liberty to Terror: Senate Votes Against Due Process Rights, THE 
ATLANTIC (Dec. 2, 2011, 11:17 AM ET), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2011/12/
ceding-liberty-to-terror-senate-votes-against-due-process-rights/249388/  
“It has been the law of the United States for decades that an American citizen on our soil 
who collaborates with the enemy has committed an act of war and will be held under the 
law of war, not domestic criminal law,” he said.  “In World War II it was perfectly 
proper to hold an American citizen as an enemy combatant who helped the Nazis. But 
we believe, somehow, in 2011, that is no longer fair.  That would be wrong. My God, 
what are we doing in 2011?  Do you not think al Qaeda is trying to recruit people here at 
home?  Is the homeland the battlefield?  You better believe it is the battlefield.” 
 257.  In order to understand the current move to target shari’ah, a brief history of the post 9/11 
reactions to Muslims in the public is necessary.  Because this article focuses on the anti-shari’ah 
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measures, the account here cannot be exhaustive.  It aims merely to provide a sense of the larger 
attempts at regulating and expelling Muslims.  I should also note here that there is another account, 
which is that of the societal rejection of these attempts and support for Muslim Americans.  For 
example the recent outrage at the decision of Lowe’s to no longer advertise during the TLC show 
American Muslims caused a number of online campaigns against the retailer.  See Greg Sargent, 
Turning Up the Heat on Lowe’s and Anti-Muslim Bigotry, The Plum Line, WASHPOST OPINIONS 
(Dec. 14, 2011, 12:46 PM ET), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/plum-line/post/turning-up-
the-heat-on-lowes-and-anti-muslim-bigotry/2011/12/14/gIQARVrAuO_blog.html.  However, I do 
not present that account here because I seek to describe the context in which the anti-shari’ah bills 
arose within the movements against Muslims.  
  After the 9/11 attacks, the immediate reaction on part of many non-Muslim Americans 
was outrage expressed through physical attacks on Muslims and Muslim symbols (mosques and 
other property).  Indeed, reports of violence and discrimination against Muslims rose markedly in 
the aftermath of the attacks.  See, e.g., Terrorists & Muslims, supra note 251.  These knee-jerk 
reactions were to be expected particularly when perpetrated against a “visible” minority.  The 
federal authorities mimicked this societal convulsion by immediately rounding up Muslim men in 
immigration sweeps.  Id. at 36.  However, after the initial physical violence abated and the 
government’s efforts yielded nothing more than full internment centers, a concerted attempt at 
demonizing Islam in the social sphere began in earnest.  Questions about the ability of Muslims to 
be faithful to their religion and patriotic Americans arose exacerbating the already Manichean 
discourse.  Seemingly overnight, people who had been on the fringe for focusing on Islam and 
Muslims in the 1980s and 1990s became experts and media celebrities.  Muslims who were willing 
to turn on their own communities and religion were elevated as the “voice of reason” and 
representatives of “good Muslims.”  Those Muslims who either resisted the regulation of state and 
society or criticized American policies particularly the domestic measures against Muslim 
communities and the two wars on Afghanistan and Iraq were linked to terrorist organizations and 
labeled traitors.  See generally DAVID COLE, ENEMY ALIENS: DOUBLE STANDARDS AND 
CONSTITUTIONAL FREEDOMS IN THE WAR ON TERRORISM 47 (2003) (citing “We Are Not the 
Enemy”: Hate Crimes Against Arabs, Muslims, and Those Perceived to be Arab or Muslim after 
September 11, 14 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH 6, 14 (Nov. 2002), available at 
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/usa1102.pdf; Bias Incidents Against Muslims Are 
Soaring, Islamic Council Says, N.Y. TIMES, May 1, 2002, at A3, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2002/05/01/us/bias-incidents-against-muslims-are-soaring-islamic-
council-says.html; Susan Sachs, For Many American Muslims, Complaints of Quiet but Persistent 
Bias, N.Y. TIMES, April 25, 2002, at A16). 
  From these anxieties and debates, several other projects arose.  In academia, a concerted 
push has been made to generate knowledge about Muslims even while foreclosing the space for 
Muslim scholars and those deemed “pro-Islam” to speak.  Organizations like CampusWatch and 
JihadWatch routinely target academics who have either defended Muslims or written about 
Muslims or Islam in anything but a negative light.  See STEPHEN SHEEHI, ISLAMOPHOBIA: THE 
IDEOLOGICAL CAMPAIGN AGAINST MUSLIMS (2011).  In 2007, the concern about how Muslims and 
Islamic history is portrayed spilled into the public arena when the Khalil Gibran public school in 
New York that sought to teach Arabic language and culture became a point of focus.  The Muslim 
head of school was removed from her position as a result of a campaign against the school that 
labeled it a madrassa.  The purported reason for the controversy was that she supported a group of 
girls wearing t-shirts printed with “Intifada NYC.”  Opponents of the school expressed concern that 
students would be taught radical Islamist ideology and one opined that it was nearly impossible to 
teach the language without teaching the ideology.  Similarly, Muslim parochial schools have also 
come under scrutiny as sites of indoctrination and radicalization.  See Jennifer Medina, Head of 
Arabic Language School Resigns, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 16, 2010, A23, available at http://
www.nytimes.com/2010/03/17/nyregion/17school.html (detailing the finding of discrimination 
against Khalil Gibran’s founding principal, Debbie Montaser). 
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laws deploy strategies like redefinition and stereotyping to marginalize 
and expel Muslims from the identity of “real” Americans.  The architects 
of these laws legitimize their agenda through a discourse of national 
security and through the construction of a very specific enemy that must 
be dealt with through specific laws.  That is to say, the redefinition of 
Islam to a terrorist religious ideology, the construction of Muslims as 
latent terrorists because they are primarily driven by this culture/religion, 
and then the application of laws that secure the homeland and those who 
rightfully “belong” in it, achieves the broader political goal of denying 
Muslims any quarter. 
In this section, I want to briefly examine three effects of the broader 
project on Muslims both locally and globally: expulsion, detention, and 
death.  These effects can be placed on a continuum with expulsion or 
marginalization being the most likely effect for U.S. Muslims, detention 
is an effect that has been felt globally from criminal and INS detentions 
“over here” to Guantanamo, Bagram, and Abu Ghraib “over there.”  
Finally, death is seldom an effect here in the United States.  However, 
death is an everyday effect in places like Afghanistan and Iraq where 
human rights are made subservient to our security. 
1. Expulsion 
The act of expelling Muslims (and other undesirables) from the 
mainstream has taken on a number of forms.  In this Article, I have 
argued that the anti-shari’ah laws that have been proposed or enacted are 
not simply attempts to protect society from a security threat but also to 
stigmatize and ostracize a group of people.  The argument that is 
advanced in support of these laws is that any tolerance for Muslim life 
starts us on the slippery slope to a full-fledged shari’ah-ruled society.258  
As a result, shari’ah and consequently any accommodation for Muslims 
in public should be denied.  The laws are themselves an attempt to expel 
the undesirable Other by preventing its recognition or accommodation in 
the public. 
As I have noted above, courts in the United States are constrained 
from entering into the thickets of interpreting religion by the 
Constitution and a clear jurisprudential posture evident in First 
Amendment religion cases.259  They rely on neutral principles to make 
 
 258.  See supra notes 76-89 and accompanying text. 
 259.  In Lemon v. Kurtz, 403 U.S. 602 (1971), the Supreme Court laid out a three-part test in 
order to determine whether a law runs afoul of the first amendment.  Id. at 612-613.  The test is 
comprised of three prongs: first, the state action in question must serve a “secular legislative 
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decisions about cases involving religion to avoid precisely the problem 
of explicating religious principles or law.  Yet the anti-shari’ah/anti-
foreign law measures in the states want to recreate the wheel to make 
absolutely clear that courts may not rely on shari’ah in any way to make 
their determinations.  If the purpose of this seeming redundancy is to 
prevent courts from becoming entangled in religion, there is nothing 
novel about this as courts have been constrained from venturing into 
such dangerous territory already.260  However, if these laws want to 
eradicate the very mention of or reference to shari’ah in the courts, there 
may be serious implications for our judicial process of determining when 
to give comity to foreign judgments in the United States.  Without the 
ability to reference foreign law (that is on occasion based on shari’ah), 
this long-established practice would be replaced with an a priori 
generalization about the incompatibility of any law “tainted” by shari’ah 
with U.S. law.  In essence, the very comparison that is required to make 
a judgment about whether the foreign decree comports with our values 
and our public policy would be rendered impossible.261  This creates 
inefficiencies and burdens by forcing new suits.  If the laws do not seek 
to force re-litigation but merely use our laws as the yardstick by which 
foreign judgments are measured, then as I have argued above, the choice 
of law rules, comity, and the supremacy clause already do this work.  In 
sum, these laws have limited utility for courts in preventing the 
 
purpose”; second, it must have a secular effect; and third, it must not result in excessive 
entanglement between church and state.  Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997) (referencing 
Lemon, 403 U.S. at 613-614). 
 260.  Id. 
 261.  What is unstated is that, if the court was required to determine the existence of a marriage 
without reference to Israeli law that mandates shari’ah in personal law matters for Muslims, the 
court would have to substitute some alternative law presumably state law.  The result is that courts 
would be forced to evaluate each marriage under that alternate law and determine de novo whether 
it exists regardless of the length and validity of the relationship entered into in another country 
under their laws.  Although most marriages would likely pass muster under this form of review, the 
prospect that some religiously and legally valid foreign marriages would be rendered invalid simply 
because they vary either procedurally or substantively from state law should be cause for concern.  
Further, the burden on courts would be increased substantially. 
In addition to those whose marriages have been solemnized abroad, couples married in religious 
ceremonies within the United States would also face a similar problem unless they can show that 
their religious marriage conformed to civil standards.  In most states, a marriage requires two 
procedural elements: a license and a ceremony.  See HOMER H. CLARK, THE LAW OF DOMESTIC 
RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 35-38 (1988).  The state provides the license to marry, however, 
the ceremony can either be secular or religious.  Id.  The result of enforcing laws that seek to ban 
shari’ah in state courts may be a state-imposed secular ceremony.  While this may be acceptable to 
many, it is difficult to argue that shari’ah could be singled out as a “foreign law” as the drafters of 
the legislation seek to do; Jewish, Catholic and even some Protestant ceremonies would also be 
suspect as they are arguably “foreign” imports. 
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encroachment of foreign laws that run against our public policy.262  
What they do instead is pass a value judgment about shari’ah as a 
barbaric legal code, reducing it to only its most grievous flaws while 
valorizing our own legal system as superior, civilized and, therefore, 
irreconcilable with shari’ah.  That judgment passed not only on a 
complex and ancient legal system also marks Muslims as barbaric.  
Consequently, the anti-shari’ah proponents might argue that forcing 
Muslims to assimilate totally to a more advanced, modern, secular 
system by refusing to recognize shari’ah is merely progress and a net 
benefit to all. 
Should these laws be upheld, they will undoubtedly have their 
intended consequence in forcing Muslims as a religious community into 
the closet.263  The legal prohibition on relying on shari’ah would have an 
impact on contracts, prenuptial agreements, wills, and the ability to 
request accommodation for religious practice in the public sphere.  
Without reference to the religious law that gives meaning and definition 
to Muslim life, how is a court to assess any claim that involves Islam?  
For concrete examples of what is at stake for Muslim life in the United 
States, we can examine two hypotheticals: first is that of a shari’ah 
compliant will in probate and the second a private contract based on 
shari’ah law. 
Consider a will that provides for the distribution of the estate based 
on the shari’ah principles.  In his suit against Oklahoma, Muneer Awad 
 
 262.  Focusing on religion, these anti-shari’ah laws are not noxious because they attack 
religion in the public square.  Indeed, Liberalism’s long history has been replete with attempts at 
placing religion squarely in its proper place: in the private.  See generally JOHN LOCKE, A LETTER 
CONCERNING TOLERATION (2011).  At least theoretically, Liberalism demands this closeting and 
Marxism goes further and requires that for true human emancipation to occur, religion must be 
eradicated entirely.  See generally Karl Marx, On the Jewish Question, in THE MARX-ENGELS 
READER (Richard Tucker, ed., 1978)  (Rather, these laws target one religion in particular insisting 
that it is not a religion but rather an ideology itself and revealing the anti-shari’ah movements own 
deeply ideological connections.  While we might analyze the current instances Islamophobic 
legislation as racism, it goes well beyond that.  These events partake of a broader imperial ideology 
in which law is instrumentalized to both create subjects and govern them.  See Mamdani supra note 
234.  As such, the attempt to pass anti-shari’ah laws is one instance of the global regulation of 
Muslims in the war on terror, regardless of what they have or have not done but based on who they 
are.  Moreover, legally and socially, the power to define rests in the hands of those who seek to 
govern, who wield both social and political power.  The result of the definition of Muslims in 
consonance with categories generated in the war against global terrorism is that Muslims continue 
to receive the attention of the “good guys” who are bravely rolling back the influence of the “bad 
guys.”   
 263.  The Attorney General of Oklahoma has vowed to move forward with defending the Save 
Our State amendment now that the preliminary injunction has been upheld.  The next step is a trial 
on the merits in which the court will decide on the Constitutionality of the amendment on 
substantive grounds and issue a permanent injunction. 
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made precisely this claim.264  In his will, he incorporates by reference 
the Sahih Bukhari compilation of Hadiths (the examples and sayings of 
the Prophet Muhammad) that is one of the sources of shari’ah.265  Such 
a will could not be probated in Oklahoma because it references a 
shari’ah source.  The only work around is to put all the provisions in the 
will itself in neutral language. 
Similarly, if two parties form a contract that will be governed by 
shari’ah law and one party fails to perform, these laws may make it 
impossible to enforce the contract.  Take, for instance, a contract for the 
supply of halal meat where the seller breaches by failing to adhere to the 
halal standards of butchering.266  How is one to determine whether the 
contract has been breached?  The court would have to apply neutral 
principles to assess whether the procedures were fair without getting into 
the substance of shari’ah laws but the breach is in the process of 
butchering, which necessitates an inquiry into shari’ah requirements.267  
However, this would be proscribed under the law as it is written.  The 
court would have to assess the contract under entirely neutral principles, 
in fact, rewriting the agreement.  The result is that none of these 
agreements would likely be enforceable through a civil court. 
Of course, it is possible to argue that requiring Muslims to couch 
their agreement in neutral language in the first place (although in the 
halal meat scenario, it is virtually impossible) is not an onerous burden.  
However, this argument fails to address the question why Muslims 
should bear the stigma of having their religious law denied recognition 
by the state?268  One may infer that this erasure of Muslims from the 
public is precisely what is desired by the architects of the law, despite 
their denials of such motives. 
In addition to these laws that prevent Muslims from seeking judicial 
intervention, entities that seek to deny Muslims accommodation for 
 
 264.  Awad v. Ziriax, 754 F.Supp. 2d 1298, 1302 (W.D. Okla. 2010). 
 265.  Leah Nelson, Oklahoma’s Shariah Law Ban Creates Controversy, INTELLIGENCE REP., 
Spring 2011, available at http://www.splcenter.org/get-informed/intelligence-report/browse-all-
issues/2011/spring/oklahoma-shariah-law-ban-creates-controversy. 
 266.  Much like the requirements of Halacha that food be kosher, in order for meat to be halal 
it must be ritually slaughtered by a Muslim.  Observant Muslims will not eat meat that is not halal. 
 267.  For instance, in order to determine whether the contract had been performed, the court 
would have to inquire into whether the ritual killing had been done according to shari’ah standards.  
That would mean taking testimony about the form of the killing and the words spoken, which are of 
course embedded in the religion. 
 268.  It should be noted here that Muslims would not be the only ones adversely impacted.  
Similar measures inevitably bear consequences for other religious groups like Jews, Hindus and 
Buddhists.  In the case of the Arizona law, the lumping of “outsider” religions is explicit.  See supra 
notes 55-59 and accompanying text (discussing the Arizona law). 
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prayer, ritual slaughter, or the wearing of headscarves are numerous.269  
Recent discussions about loyalty oaths are another form of marking 
Muslims as Other.270  These oaths seek to elicit certain kinds of political 
conformity voluntarily or force a national identity on Muslims that other 
U.S. citizens do not have to adhere to.  Moreover, the requirement reifies 
the essentialism of Muslim identity in which following Islam as a 
religion forecloses the possibility of a political affiliation with the 
nation.  It also reifies the identity of the “real” American, defining it is 
an identity that cannot be tainted by Muslimness. 
Another form of expulsion that has occurred from the outset of the 
War on Terror is rendition.  The practice of removing Muslims and 
sending them to countries in which they can be tortured is a stark effect 
of the construction and extraordinary treatment of the enemy.  Those 
rendered are given no due process, they are not even informed of what 
they have been accused and where they are going.  The treatment of 
prisoners assumed to be guilty includes stripping and photographing 
them nude, shaving their face and heads, depriving them of sleep, 
slapping them, dousing them with water, forcing them to stand for 
lengthy periods of time, forcing them to assume stress positions, placing 
them in cells where they cannot stand, and “walling” to name a few 
practices.  All the cases reported in the public were Muslim men.  The 
U.S. government’s willingness to simply disappear these people 
regardless of their innocence or guilt chillingly reminds us of what 
 
 269.  See Elmenayer v. ABF Freight Sys., Inc., 318 F.3d 130 (2d Cir. 2003); Spell v. 
Muhammad, 756 So.2d 748 (Miss. 2000); E.E.O.C. v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 835 F. Supp. 911 (N.D. 
Tex. 1993). 
 270.  See Huma Khan & Amy Bingham, GOP Debate: Newt Gingrich’s Comparison of 
Muslims and Nazis Sparks Outrage, ABC NEWS (June 14, 2011), 
http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/gop-debate-newt-gingrichs-comparison-muslims-nazis-
sparks/story?id=13838355#.Txr2qJihDzI: 
At the New Hampshire debate Monday night, Gingrich responded to questions about 
loyalty tests for administration officials, saying, “[t]he Pakistani who emigrated to the 
U.S., became a citizen, built a car bomb which luckily failed to go off in Times Square, 
was asked by the federal judge, how could he have done that when he signed and when 
he swore an oath to the United States.  And he looked at the judge and said, ‘you’re my 
enemy. I lied.’” 
“Now, I just want to go out on a limb here. I’m in favor of saying to people, if you’re not 
prepared to be loyal to the United States, you will not serve in my administration, 
period,” Gingrich added, to applause. 
But Gingrich didn’t stop there, despite an attempt by moderators to interject.  He 
compared hiring Muslims to how Americans dealt with Nazis in the 1940s: “We did this 
in dealing with the Nazis. We did this in dealing with the Communists. And it was 
controversial both times and both times we discovered after a while, you know, there are 
some genuinely bad people who would like to infiltrate our country. And we have got to 
have the guts to stand up and say, ‘No.’” 
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occurs when we treat some groups as requiring extraordinary laws or as 
deserving no legal protection at all. 
Discriminatory legal treatment has social consequences, it evinces a 
certain permission to follow suit.  Crimes against Muslims in the United 
States after 9/11 have risen dramatically.271  Public officials speak about 
Muslims in terms that would not be tolerated against any other group 
(except Latinos) in the United States.272  Increasingly, Muslims are 
suffering employment harms from refusals of accommodation for 
religious practice to discrimination in hiring and promotion to wrongful 
termination.273  In sum, the discourse in the public sphere and official 
support for unequal treatment has material effects on the lives of 
Muslims who bear the group responsibility for acts done by individuals 
and, therefore, must be subject to collective punishment. 
2. Internment and Detention 
Another effect of the discourse on Muslims and national identity is 
the fear of the failure of vigilance and the inevitability of another attack.  
There is more sympathy with the anti-shari’ah laws that seek to draw a 
closer connection between the practice of Islam and terrorism as that 
fear is ratcheted up in the public.  As the original Tennessee bill 
evidences, the prevalent view is that shari’ah is part and parcel of 
terrorism, which makes it difficult to separate “peaceful” practice of 
religion (and the adherence to shari’ah) with a commitment to violently 
overthrow the state.274  Anti-shari’ah measures are then justified as a 
first step to preventing radical Islam from getting a foothold. 
Of course, merely preventing shari’ah from being enforced civilly 
among private citizens may be necessary but it certainly is not sufficient.  
It does not deal with Muslims themselves and the threat that they pose; it 
merely seeks to stem their ideology.  This has revived the possibility of 
 
 271.  Aziz Huq, Defend Muslims, Defend America, NY TIMES, June 19, 2011, A27, available 
at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/20/opinion/20huq.html?ref=shariaislamiclaw. 
 272.  See supra note 270.  Despite the fact that Gingrich’s comments sparked outrage, similar 
sentiments were expressed by Herman Cain and other Republican candidates.  See, e.g., Ron Paul 
Takes Swipes at GOP Rivals, Says Michele Bachmann “Hates Muslims” ABC NEWS (Dec. 17, 2011 
8:31 AM), http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2011/12/ron-paul-takes-swipes-at-gop-rivals-says-
michele-bachmann-hates-muslims.  See also Cyra Akila Choudhury, Collateral Damage: The 
Ghettoization of Muslims in the Race for the White House, in RACE 2008: CRITICAL REFLECTIONS 
ON A HISTORICAL CAMPAIGN (Mendible, ed., 2010). 
 273.  Steven Greenhouse, Muslims Report Rising Discrimination at Work, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 
23, 2010, B1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/24/business/
24muslim.html?pagewanted=1&_r=1&ref=business. 
 274.  See supra note 19 and accompanying text. 
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internment as both punishment and prevention.275  Albeit these calls 
come from a small minority of those on the far right; they are present 
and have found some sympathy among the public.276  While camps are a 
visceral threat, detention in immigration centers and jails is a reality.277  
Immigration law has provided a ready basis for the regulation of 
Muslims from the period after the Oklahoma bombing to the present.  
Indeed, it was primarily immigration law that was the basis for the 
detention of approximately five thousand Muslim and Arab men in the 
aftermath of 9/11.278 
Surveillance and profiling has led to the capture of Muslims but not 
all of these people have committed crimes or violated immigration laws.  
Muslims were held without charge or bail as material witnesses 
immediately after the attacks even when they had nothing to offer by 
way of evidence.279  Post 9/11, the government shrouded this practice in 
a veil of secrecy, refusing to articulate on what basis these witnesses 
were held.280  In some cases, there were no substantial grounds for 
believing that the witnesses had any real information yet the witnesses 
were held for extended periods of time.  Material witnesses and 
immigration detainees were not simply held and released once they were 
found to be innocent; sometimes their incarceration lasted several years 
and resulted in expulsion through deportation.281 
 
 275.  Nina Bernstein, Relatives of Interned Japanese-Americans Side With Muslims, N.Y. 
TIMES, Apr. 3, 2007, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/03/nyregion/
03detain.html?pagewanted=all. 
 276.  MICHELE MALKIN, IN DEFENSE OF INTERNMENT: THE CASE FOR RACIAL PROFILING IN 
WORLD WAR II AND THE WAR ON TERROR (2004).  See, e.g., Chris K. Iijima, Shooting Justice 
Jackson’s “Loaded Weapon” at Ysar Hamdi: Judicial Abdication at the Convergence of Korematsu 
and McCarthy, 54 SYRACUSE L. REV. 109, 132 n.132 (2004); Susan Kiyomi Serrano & Dale 
Minami, Korematsu v. United States: A “Constant Caution” in a Time of Crisis, 10 ASIAN L.J. 37, 
40, 45 (2003); Mark Tushnet, Defending Korematsu: Reflections on Civil Liberties in Wartime, 
2003 WIS. L. REV. 273 (2003).  
 277.  One man still locked up from 9/11 sweeps, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Oct. 14, 2006, 6:31:54 
PM ET), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/15264274/ns/us_news-security/t/one-man-still-locked-
sweeps/. 
 278.  David Cole, Terror Financing, Guilt by Association and the Paradigm of Prevention in 
the ‘War on Terror,’ in COUNTERTERRORISM: DEMOCRACY’S CHALLENGE 248 (Andrea Bianchi & 
Alexis Keller eds. 2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1262792. 
 279.  Ricardo J. Bascuas, The Unconstitutionality of “Hold Until Cleared”: Reexamining 
Material Witness Detentions in the Wake of the September 11th Dragnet, 58 VAND. L. REV. 677, 
679-681 (2005). 
 280.  Id. 
 281.  Id. at 689-690: 
The story of Mohammed Bellahouel’s detention shows as starkly as that of Brandon 
Mayfield how judges have authorized “material witness” detentions on unsubstantiated 
allegations and deferred to prosecutors’ claims regarding the need for secrecy.  In 
October 2001, federal agents arrested Mr. Bellahouel, an Algerian immigrant working as 
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Although no internment camps of the kinds found in the World War 
II-era have been established or are likely to be established, different 
kinds of camps are emerging as proxies.  Recently, the existence of 
secret jails has come to light.282  These Communication Management 
Units house a disproportionate number of Muslims along with tax 
resisters, eco-activists, and other convicts.  According to a lawyer from 
the Center for Constitutional Rights (“CCR”): 
“There is a tenfold over-representation of Muslim prisoners at the 
CMUs,” he says.  “So 6 percent of the national prison population is 
Muslim, and somewhere in the neighborhood of between 66 and 72 
percent of prisoners at the CMUs are Muslim.”283 
The CCR also claims that these prison units are used to segregate and 
isolate those Muslims who are considered leaders or jailhouse lawyers 
from the general population.  Prisoners are separated from their families 
 
a waiter at a restaurant in a South Florida strip mall.  The affidavit filed in support of the 
government’s application for a “material witness” arrest warrant alleged that Mr. 
Bellahouel had seen a movie in that mall with one of the 9/11 terrorists.  The source of 
this information was purportedly an unidentified employee of the movie theatre.  The 
affidavit speculated: “It is likely that Bellahouel would have waited on both 
[Mohammed] Atta and [Marwan] al Shehhi since Bellahouel had worked at the 
restaurant for 10 months, and both Atta and al Shehhi were frequent patrons during shifts 
that Bellahouel worked.”  The affidavit went on to reveal candidly (if inadvertently) that 
the FBI had no real reason to suspect Mr. Bellahouel of any wrongdoing.  It stated: “In 
the meantime, the FBI has been unable to rule out the possibility that the respondent is 
somehow linked to, or possesses knowledge of, the terrorist attacks.”   
Despite an affidavit setting forth nothing but conjecture, relying on an undisclosed 
source, and conceding that the government had no idea whether Mr. Bellahouel had any 
useful information, a judge in Virginia issued a warrant for his arrest as a “material 
witness” to the 9/11 attacks.  The unsupported inferential leap that Mr. Bellahouel must 
have waited on two of the 9/11 terrorists is as senseless as the FBI’s contention in Mr. 
Mayfield’s case that, because there was no record of Mr. Mayfield traveling to Spain, he 
must have done so under a false identity.  Just as the FBI’s reason for incarcerating Mr. 
Bellahouel was that it had “been unable to rule out” any possible terrorist ties, the 
government argued three years later that it could not “exclude the possibility that 
Mayfield was criminally” involved in the Spain bombings.   
As unsettling as the fact that Mr. Bellahouel was incarcerated on such thin allegations 
were the lengths to which the executive and judicial branches of the government went to 
keep the entire incident from the public.  Mr. Bellahouel was secretly held in custody for 
five months. He was released around March 2002 after testifying before the grand jury in 
Virginia and being cleared of terrorist links. 
 282.  Margot Williams & Alyson Hurt, DATA & GRAPHICS: Population Of The 
Communications Management Units, NPR (Aug. 24, 2011, 
http://www.npr.org/2011/03/08/134227726/data-graphics-population-of-the-communications-
management-units. 
 283.  Carrie Johnson & Margot Williams, ‘Guantanamo North’: Inside Secretive U.S. Prisons, 
NPR (Mar. 3, 2011, 1:09 PM), http://www.npr.org/2011/03/03/134168714/guantanamo-north-
inside-u-s-secretive-prisons. 
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and are allowed limited human contact with their families.  The CCR 
claims that the Bureau of Prisons use the CMU’s to retaliate against 
those who attempt to stand up for themselves in prison under the guise 
of preventing radicalism.284 
It is interesting to note that the Communications Management Units 
are nicknamed “Guantanamo North.”  Indeed, these facilities have taken 
a lesson from overseas detention centers and prisons like Guantanamo, 
Bagram, and Camp Delta.  The United States continues to hold civilians 
in detention without bringing charges against them.  Recently, the 
government has conceded that a majority of people detained for being 
Taliban were actually not members of that group.285  Many were 
released after relatively short incarcerations, but not all civilians have 
been so lucky.  Others in these camps have been interrogated, tortured, 
and killed in custody.286  In other words, the “enemy” is not constructed 
necessarily through their acts but rather through their beliefs and their 
identity.  As such, any Muslim is vulnerable to marking as a terrorist 
whose rights are secondary to security. 
Capturing suspected terrorists and holding them without charge or 
representation is not infrequent; Philippe Sands notes that it is an 
ongoing practice that was started at the outset of the War on Terror.287  
The recent National Defense Authorization Act of 2012 reinforces the 
power of the executive to capture and hold those suspected of terrorism 
without trial “until the end of hostilities.”  What is remarkable about this 
new bill is that it extends the power to detain to American citizens 
captured abroad.  In the U.S., Muslims may be detained through 
extensive national security and immigration laws, while in places like 
Afghanistan, they are subject to the requirements of a “war” which has 
resulted in random capture and internment without charge, possibly for 
life.288 
 
 284.  Aref, et al. v. Holder, et al., CTR. FOR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, http://ccrjustice.org/
ourcases/current-cases/aref-et-al-v-holder-et-al (last visited Jan. 19, 2013); see also Muneer I. 
Ahmed, Guantanamo is Here: The Military Commissions Act and Noncitizen Vulnerability, 2007 U. 
CHI. L. F. 1 (2007). 
 285.  Gareth Porter, ‘Most captured Taliban were civilians,’ AL JAZEERA (June 27, 2011, 
15:04), http://english.aljazeera.net/indepth/features/2011/06/2011627141529522163.html. 
 286.  Mark Mazzetti & Scott Shane, Interrogation Memos Detail Harsh Tactics by the C.I.A., 
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 16, 2009, A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/17/us/politics/
17detain.html?ref=ciainterrogations.  
 287.   See PHILIPPE SANDS, LAWLESS WORLD: A WHISTLE-BLOWING ACCOUNT OF HOW BUSH 
AND BLAIR ARE TAKING THE LAW INTO THEIR OWN HANDS 160 (2006); ANDY WORTHINGTON, 
THE GUANTANAMO FILES: THE STORIES OF THE 774 DETAINEES IN AMERICA’S ILLEGAL PRISON 
188 (2007). 
 288.  WORTHINGTON, supra note 287, at 188.   
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C. Collateral Damage/Death 
Those incarcerated within the prison system of the United States 
have protections of laws and a civil society that inquires into such 
unfortunate incidents as custodial death.  As a result, prisoners held 
inside the country’s borders are less likely to die in custody or be subject 
to the degree of torture suffered by Muslims in remote places like Iraq or 
Afghanistan and in places to which they may be rendered secretly 
through the security apparatus.289  In addition to the targeted killing of 
militants and the deaths in custody, the vast majority of the loss of life at 
the hands of U.S. forces has occurred from drone attacks and bombing. 
In conducting the war on terror, the United States has been the 
catalyst in the loss of over a hundred thousand Iraqi civilian lives.290  In 
Afghanistan, conservative estimates claim that a third of the people 
killed in drone attacks are civilians.291  On the other hand, the Brookings 
Institute claims that more than six hundred civilians have been killed, 
approximately ten for every militant.292  Aside from bombings, there 
have also been several stories of U.S. troops killing civilians for sport 
and of U.S. contractors killing unarmed civilians in Iraq and 
Afghanistan.293  From these stories, it is obvious that one effect of the 
creation of a Muslim enemy, making it the object of national security, is 
the ease with which that enemy can be killed and the lesser value of 
Muslim lives.294  And that killing is legally justified through the clinical 
term collateral damage or exceptionalized as in the extrajudicial murders 
of civilians, nevertheless fails to address the underlying rationale for 
why such a high cost to civilians is possible at all. 
Judith Butler notes that some lives are not grievable;295 that is, they 
 
 289.  Id. 
 290.  Iraq death toll ‘soared post-war,’ BBC NEWS (Oct. 29, 2004, 16:09 GMT), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/3962969.stm. 
 291.  Peter Bergen & Katherine Tiedemann, The Year of the Drone: An Analysis of U.S. Drone 
Strikes in Pakistan, 2004-2010, NEW AM. FOUND., 3 (Feb. 24, 2010), http://
counterterrorism.newamerica.net/sites/newamerica.net/files/policydocs/bergentiedemann2.pdf. 
 292.  Daniel L. Byman, Do Targeted Killings Work?, BROOKINGS (July 14, 2009), 
http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2009/07/14-targeted-killings-byman. 
 293.  Craig Whitlock, Members of Stryker Combat Brigade in Afghanistan accused of killing 
civilians for sport, WASH. POST (Sept. 18, 2010, 9:39 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2010/09/18/AR2010091803935.html.  
 294.  David Johnston & John M. Broder, F.B.I. Says Guards Killed 14 Iraqis Without Cause, 
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 2007, A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/14/world/
middleeast/14blackwater.html. 
 295.  I borrow this term from Judith Butler who has written eloquently about the 
unmournability of the lives of some people.  See JUDITH BUTLER, PRECARIOUS LIFE: THE POWER OF 
MOURNING AND VIOLENCE (2006). 
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evoke no empathy for their deaths.296  Certainly the construction of the 
dead as belonging to an uncivilized, premodern, and violent culture and 
religion coupled with the antiseptic language used to describe what they 
experience (collateral damage, collateral mortality, precision bombing) 
makes distance and avoidance of the stark realities much more 
possible.297  I would go so far as to suggest that it is not merely that there 
is no empathy for the deaths of Muslim civilians and even combatants 
but that among some supporters of the war, there is a sense that these 
deaths are necessary.298  They are the just desserts of a people who 
should collectively pay for the crimes of a few nominal co-religionists.  
This idea of collective punishment, the idea that entire populations can 
be subjected to violence in order to suppress resistance or to punish the 
few is one that dates back to colonial times if not before and acceptable 
for those waging the war on terror.299 
The ongoing vilification of Muslims starts with seemingly 
inconsequential assaults like their degradation through these anti-
shari’ah laws and unequal treatment or protection by the state and in 
society.  Yet it progresses easily to justifications for collective 
punishment: from mass surveillance to the indefinite detention of 
Muslim men without charge or even proof of terrorist activity, to their 
custodial deaths, and then ending in the indiscriminate killings of 
 
 296.  JUDITH BUTLER, FRAMES OF WAR: WHEN IS LIFE GRIEVABLE? 31 (2009): 
The shared condition of precariousness implies that the body is constitutively social and 
interdependent—a view clearly confirmed in different ways by both Hobbes and Hegel.  
Yet, precisely because each body finds itself potentially threatened by others who are, by 
definition, precarious as well, forms of domination follow.  This standard Hegelian point 
takes on specific meanings under contemporary conditions of war: the shared condition 
of precariousness leads not to reciprocal recognition, but to a specific exploitation of 
targeted populations, of lives that are not quite lives, cast as “destructible” and 
“ungreivable.”  Such populations are “lose-able,” or can be forfeited, precisely because 
they are framed as being already lost of forfeited; they are cast as threats to human life as 
we know it rather than as living populations in need of protection from illegitimate state 
violence, famine, or pandemics.  Consequently, when such lives are lost they are not 
greivable, since, in the twisted logic that rationalizes their death, the loss of such 
populations is deemed necessary to protect the lives of “the living.” 
 297.  Id. 
 298.  Members of my own extended family were killed in the 9/11 attacks on New York.  See 
also Rick Hampson, For families of Muslim 9/11 Victims, a new pain, USA TODAY (Sept. 9, 2010, 
1:56 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2010-09-03-1Amuslims911_CV_N.htm.  
According the Iraq Body Count, the number of people killed in Iraq alone is over 100,000.  See 
IRAQBODYCOUNT.ORG, www.Iraqbodycount.org (last visited Jan. 19, 2013). 
 299.  For a discussion of collective punishment meted out in the United States, see ANNY 
BAKALIAN & MEHDI BOZOGMEHR, BACKLASH 9/11: MIDDLE EASTERN AND MUSLIM AMERICANS 
RESPOND 1-22 (2009); for a discussion of international collective punishment, see Larry Cata 
Backer, The Fuhrer Principle of International Law: Individual Responsibility and Collective 
Punishment, 21 PENN ST. INT’L L. REV. 509 (2002). 
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Muslims in drone attacks.  All attempts at armed resistance are neatly 
folded back into the narrative of their barbarism and aggression, 
reinforcing our own sense of justification for the wars.  Nonviolent 
resistance is all that remains morally available to those who are subject 
to overwhelming (but therapeutic) violence.  Civil rights in the United 
States and human rights are, then, an important means by which to resist 
the juggernaut of a globalized national security regime that threatens us 
with Dystopia 2.300  But these means must overcome the superior claims 
of national security and a state that has the power to disregard law or 
make it up to suit when expedient.301 
V. CONCLUSION: TOWARDS AN INCLUSIVE SECURITY 
In this Article I have made the argument that these anti-shari’ah 
laws are not about protecting the United States’ secular legal system nor 
are they about national security.  It has challenged the use of family law 
as evidence that the laws are a necessity.  The cases fail to support the 
claim that Muslims are using shari’ah in family law as a Trojan horse for 
the infiltration of the state.  Rather, these laws reflect a continuing 
hostility towards Muslims and the will to discriminate on the basis of 
religion.  Through the Article I have traced some of the methods used in 
stereotyping and vilifying Muslims in the United States and globally, 
and it has examined some of the effects of such identity constructions.  
In sum, I have argued that even if they are ineffective as national 
security laws and even if they are struck down as unconstitutional, these 
anti-shari’ah laws have a social effect on Muslims.  The condemnation 
harm is felt before the challenge reaches the courthouse doorsteps.  As 
such, they must be taken seriously. 
Further, I argue that what is done to Muslims within the United 
States can be linked to what is done to Muslims globally in the War on 
Terror.  There is a dialectical relationship of fear and loathing of 
Muslims both here and there—the identities co-construct each other.  
The anti-shari’ah measures denying Muslims the same rights as those 
given to other religious communities parallel the denial of human rights 
or international law that are available to all people to Muslims globally.  
The tendency then is to essentialize Muslims in a way that makes them 
 
 300.  See supra notes 1 and 2 and accompanying text describing Dystopia 1 & 2. 
 301.  The Homeland Security Act of 2002 contains a “sense of Congress” provision that 
recognizes the broad powers afforded the President in the event of a serious threat to national 
security.  For instance, the Insurrection Act (10 U.S.C. §331-335) and the Stafford Act (42 U.S.C.A. 
§5121-5207) allow the President to use the military to restore public order. 6 U.S.C. §466(a)(5) 
(2006).   
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forever alien regardless of where they are and the result is a shrugging 
willingness to treat them with impunity and to sacrifice “their” security 
for ours. 
In the rush to create a visible enemy, to delineate the threat, what is 
often forgotten is the vulnerability of Muslims who are caught between 
the hammer of a nationalist, exclusionary identity construction espoused 
in national security law and the anvil of an Islamist political ideology 
that uses religion and constructs Muslim identity to similarly exclude the 
vast majority of Muslims.302  What are the consequences of acting and 
legislating based on the belief that Muslims cannot be real Americans or 
that they should be denied the protection of human rights globally?  
What is the cost of marginalizing a community as “alien” or outcast?  I 
want to suggest two very real consequences.303 
A. Other Forms of Terror 
First, the concentration on Muslims and Islamist terrorism fails to 
bring to public attention the threat of terrorism committed by people like 
Anders Breivik and Timothy McVeigh.  In spite of the media attention, 
the 2011 King hearings on so-called homegrown “Muslim radicalism” 
failed to bring to light the kind of evidence that would demonstrate that 
such radicalism is occurring in the Muslim communities.  Rather recent 
data shows that radicalism is in fact declining.  Yet the threat from far-
right extremists that recruit young people for their militias has been an 
ongoing threat to the lives and security of many minorities in the United 
States.304  Moreover, such a focus on Muslims after 9/11 fails to examine 
the growing societal issues that is giving rise to violence against 
 
 302.  Muslims have been on the frontline of terrorism for several decades.  Recent attacks have 
targeted Pakistan, Morocco, Bangladesh, and Indonesia to name a few countries.  See, e.g., 
Timeline: Terrorist attacks in Pakistan in May 2011, INT’L HERALD TRIBUNE, May 25, 2011, 
available at http://tribune.com.pk/story/175661/timeline-terrorist-attacks-in-pakistan-in-may-2011/; 
Moroccan tourist café terrorist attack leaves at least 15 dead, THE GUARDIAN (Apr. 28, 2011, 
15:16 EDT), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/apr/28/marrakech-tourist-cafe-terrorist-attack; 
Eben Kaplan, Bangladesh: Nationwide Attacks Raise Fears of Growing Islamist Presence, COUNCIL 
ON FOREIGN RELATIONS (Aug. 29, 2005), http://www.cfr.org/bangladesh/bangladesh-nationwide-
attacks-raise-fears-growing-islamist-presence/p8767; Farouk Arnaz, Indonesian Police Targeted in 
“Terror Attack,” THE JAKARTA GLOBE (May 25, 2011), http://www.thejakartaglobe.com/home/
breaking-news-indonesian-police-targeted-in-terror-attack/443121. 
 303.  See generally Natsu Taylor Saito, Whose Liberty? Whose Security? The USA Patriot Act 
in the Context of Cointelpro and the Unlawful Repression of Political Dissent, 81 OR. L. REV. 1051 
(2002). 
 304.  See Sheryl Gay Stolberg & Laurie Goodstein, Domestic Terrorism Hearing Opens with 
Contrasting Views on Dangers, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 2011, A15, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/11/us/politics/11king.html. 
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minorities and fails to label exactly the same acts as terror.  In other 
words, the current national security focus on Muslims as the main threat 
blinds us to the possibility of other threats that come from secular or 
other religious groups who are actively seeking to undermine our secular 
society and way of life.305  That makes prevention much harder. 
I have argued elsewhere306 that racial profiling as a tactic to prevent 
terrorism is bound to fail; over the course of the last ten years, I have 
been largely vindicated in that view.  Further, I have argued that 
focusing on one community leaves a rather large blind spot which other 
groups are likely to exploit.  As mentioned above, this blind spot was 
precisely what led to the immediate attribution of the Norway massacre 
to Muslims and immigrants.307  What is even more perplexing is that 
despite the fact that a “homegrown,” “real” Norwegian perpetrated the 
violence, the following debate was about whether further immigration 
curbs should be put into place.308  In addition, the connection between 
Anders Breivik and the propaganda of U.S. proponents of Islamophobia, 
did little to quell the appetite for such extremism on the part of both U.S. 
politicians and anti-Muslim groups.309  There was little conversation 
about the kind of prejudice that fueled the steps needed to prevent 
racism.  Rather, it is perplexing to note that even when Muslims have 
not committed acts of terrorism, they have been made to pay. 
B. Alienating Stakeholders and Creating Insecurity 
This brings me to the next problem of an exclusionary national 
security law.  A legal regime based on stereotypes that uses identities 
like race and religion rather than politics and actions runs the risk of 
alienating those best able to help secure communities from terrorist 
violence.  Profiling and surveillance and gathering data on religious 
observance is wrong headed because it implies that all Muslims are 
suspect.  More dramatically, the indiscriminate killings of Muslims 
globally in the War on Terror particularly through drone attacks and 
bombing is precisely the kind of security action that implies that we do 
 
 305.  See supra note 226 and accompanying text (discussing Anders Breivik).  A similar 
reaction followed Timothy McVeigh’s Oklahoma City bombing.  See also Terror from the Right, 
SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW CTR., http://www.splcenter.org/get-informed/publications/terror-from-
the-right (last visited Jan. 19, 2013) (detailing the number of terrorist actions from the right since 
the Oklahoma bombing).   
 306.  See Terrorists & Muslims, supra note 251. 
 307.  See supra note 226 and accompanying text (discussing Breivik). 
 308.  Id.  
 309.  Id. 
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not care who “they” are because “they” are all one indistinguishable 
enemy population. 
Alienating, stigmatizing, and expelling Muslims from the normal 
protection of laws, demanding assimilation and a show of patriotism 
through the conversion away from Islam or forcibly closing the public 
space to any show of “Muslim-ness,” driving the community into the 
shadows, will not work to secure us.  Rather, these strategies become 
recruiting tools for organizations that prey upon the disaffection and 
resentments that they create.  It is not difficult to imagine that the 
Taliban will use the accidental burning of Qur’ans at the infamous 
Bagram Airbase as proof that the United States is engaged in a crusade.  
The powerful combination of ongoing civilian deaths through bombings, 
the threat of Qur’an burnings by a radical Christian preacher in Florida, 
vocal racialized discourse by political leaders, followed by actual Qur’an 
burnings at a notorious site of torture makes for an easy inference that 
Islam is the target.  And terror organizations like al Qaeda offer an 
opportunity to turn those resentments against imperialism and 
occupation into deadly action. 
C. Security with Inclusion 
If identity-based strategies do not work, we must find another way.  
I want to suggest that what will provide security is the continued 
integration that most Muslims in the United States have achieved despite 
attempts to marginalize them after 9/11.  A national security framework 
that encourages trust in law enforcement and that deals in good faith 
with all communities would work better to secure our communities.  As 
Los Angeles County Sheriff Lee Baca noted in his testimony to the King 
Commission: 
According to the Muslim Public Affairs Council (MPAC), utilizing 
information provided by respected organizations such as the 
Congressional Research Service, the Heritage Foundation, and 
Southern Poverty Law Center, there have been 77 total terror plots by 
domestic, non-Muslim perpetrators since 9/11.  In comparison, there 
have been 41 total plots by both domestic and international Muslim 
perpetrators during the same period.  Reports indicate that American 
Muslims helped foil seven of the last ten plots propagated by Al-Qaeda 
within the United States.  According to MPAC, evidence clearly 
indicates a general rise in violent extremism across ideologies.  
Clearly, we should be examining radicalization as an issue that affects 
all groups regardless of religion . . . . It is critical to build mutually 
respectful relationships with American Muslim communities and 
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endeavor to work together to protect all Americans whether locally or 
internationally . . . . The Muslim Community in Los Angeles is an 
active participant in the securing of our Homeland . . . . When I made 
critical outreach to the community after 9/11, I was overwhelmed by 
the number of Muslims who, while under threat from misinformed 
sources, were ready and willing to connect with law enforcement to 
help keep the peace.310 
As Sheriff Baca notes, without vital intelligence and trust, ensuring 
security becomes more difficult.  He aptly points out that it is impossible 
to “arrest or enforce your way out of the radicalization issue.”  Despite 
the belief in some quarters that muscular police action and even 
extrajudicial killings are justified, the war on terror has not given the 
Executive Branch a blank check.  The Supreme Court has acted to 
protect the liberties of American citizens by pushing back on the 
national security establishment.311 
Similarly, since the beginning of the War on Terror and the wars in 
Afghanistan and Iraq, there has been a vigorous push back in the realm 
of the international on the Bush doctrine of preemptive attacks and his 
Manichean worldview.  There has been some resurgence of critical 
thought drawn from earlier periods of colonialism and imperialism that 
has shed light on the global ambitions behind the War on Terror that 
threatened nations with extinction.  More needs to be done to interrogate 
the identity construction of the enemy that operates both globally and 
locally and that seems to allow for a legally justified discrimination.  
Greater critical energies need to be focused on the failure of human 
rights to protect vulnerable populations from the demands of security.  
After all, we must include Muslims and their insecurity in the calculus if 
we are to ever win the War on Terror rather than fighting it endlessly. 
Recognizing the humanity of Muslims globally and valuing their 
lives is the promise of human rights and international law.  Allowing all 
Americans to believe in whatever religion with pride and safety, this is 
the promise of the United States and the vision of our founding fathers 
and mothers.  The current anti-shari’ah measures and the rest of the 
spectrum of legal and police/military interventions, the discursive 
methods and social effects of the creation of a vulnerable minority 
 
 310.  See Statement of Sheriff Leroy Baca, supra note 244.  
 311.  U.S. v. Ghailani, 743 F.Supp.2d 261 (2010) (holding that evidence obtained through 
illegal means may be excluded); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006) (holding that the 
Geneva Convention was applicable and that military commissions were illegal under the Uniform 
Code of Military Justice and international law); Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004)(holding that 
Guantanamo detainees can invoke habeas corpus). 
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singled out for punishment based on identity betray both these promises. 
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